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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters, which can be read independently.
In the rst chapter we explore distributive justice and perception of fairness using
survey data from freshmen and senior students of economics and sociology. We analyse
the impact of context and education on their preferences over a hypothetical distribution
of resources between individuals which presents a trade o¤ between e¢ ciency and equal-
ity. With context giving minimal information, economics students are less likely to favour
equality; studying economics inuences the preferences of the subjects, increasing this
di¤erence. However, when the same problem is inserted into a meaningful context, the dif-
ference disappears. Four distribution mechanisms are analysed: egalitarianism, maximin,
utilitarianism and utilitarianism with a oor constraint.
The second chapter considers a public good game with heterogeneous endowments and
incomplete information a¤ected by extreme free-riding. We overcome this problem through
the implementation of a contest in which several prizes may be awarded. We identify a
monotone equilibrium, in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment.
We prove that it is optimal for the social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but
otherwise total expected contribution is invariant to the prize structure. Finally, we show
that private provision via a contest Pareto-dominates public provision and is higher than
the total contribution raised through a lottery.
The third chapter investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to
overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods, under the assumptions of
income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. We compare ex-
perimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary
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contribution mechanism. We nd that prize-based mechanisms perform better than vol-
untary contribution in terms of public good provision after accounting for the cost of the
prize. Comparing the prize-based mechanisms, total contributions are signicantly higher
in the lottery than in the all-pay auction. Focusing on individual income types, the lot-
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Chapter 1
How Context Matters: A Survey
Based Experiment on Distributive
Justice
1.1 Introduction
One of the most interesting results that arises from dictator and ultimatum exper-
iments is that fairness seems to be a strong concern. Experimental results on the
ultimatum game show that a large fraction of players o¤er a fairallocation and
that unfairo¤ers are systematically rejected. Furthermore, while economists tend
to evaluate allocations purely quantitatively, these experimental data also suggest
that whether an allocation is seen as fair can depend on qualitative factors, the
context in which it is presented and the way it is framed. In addition, the data from
dictator experiments suggest that there is signicant heterogeneity in what people
consider fair, with many people giving nothing as well as many splitting the available
resources equally.
The main motivation for the present study is the further investigation of this
evidence. However, we will not employ a game theoretical approach. This paper is a
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survey based investigation of perception of fairness and attitudes towards distributive
justice. We focus on unbiased justice, or justice from the viewpoint of an impartial
spectator, in comparison to many other studies that involve stakes and analyse the
e¤ect of fairness on the stakeholders.
Our aim is twofold. First, we wish to analyse how context inuences preferences
over a hypothetical distribution of resources and in what way adding justice-related
information to the context a¤ects judgements. Second, we explore the impact of edu-
cation on perception of fairness. We surveyed both rst and last year undergraduate
students of economics and sociology (hereafter referred to as freshmen and seniors).
We submitted to them di¤erent versions of a problem involving the distribution of
resources between two individuals in which we asked them to choose the distribution
that they considered the most fair. The two individuals obtain a di¤erent utility from
the resources and there is, therefore, a trade o¤ between e¢ ciency, which involves
handing more resources to the more productive individual, and equality, which might
demand an equal division even if that would not maximise total output. We will
refer to this problem as the distribution problem. We found that, with a context
giving minimal information, economics students were less likely to favour equality
than sociology students and this di¤erence was more marked in senior students.
Thus, studying economics seemed to have inuenced the preferences of the subjects
over the distribution of resources, while we found no signicant di¤erence between
the choices of sociology freshmen and seniors. This evidence suggests that previous
survey studies carried out on economics students (see for example Engelmann and
Strobel, 2004) might have obtained di¤erent results with a di¤erent subject popula-
tion. However, when the same question was rephrased to give a meaningful context,
there was now signicant agreement over which allocation was fairest and there was
no signicant di¤erence between economics and sociology students.
Let us consider the rst of our aims. It is well known that perception of fairness
and behaviour related to fairness judgements are context dependent. The set of
individuals being compared, the type of good being distributed, the historical terms
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of transactions or the framing of information are all examples of contextual elements.
Probably the most cited study of justice in economics that emphisises the variation of
views of fairness with context is that of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). We
are interested on how such judgements are related to various classes of context. One
of the rst examples of studies in this direction is that of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984),
who analysed how judgements are a¤ected by context when it species whether
individuals need the goods to be distributed or they simply like them. There exists
by now a large economic literature on this topic (see Schokkaert and Overlaet, 1989;
Gaertner, 1994; Gaertner, Jungeilges, and Neck, 2001; Gaertner and Jungeilges,
2002; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005, among
others) as well as a lot of evidence from the psychological and sociological literature
(for an overview see Konow 2003).
As we will explain in Section 1.2, we consider the specic problem of how in-
tuitions of fairness vary with contextual factors which determine whether or not
individuals are responsible for the outcomes of their actions. Several papers from
the social choice literature have addressed this issue (e.g., see Schokkaert and La-
grou, 1983; Schokkaert and Overlaet, 1989; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Cap-
pelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2005; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005), and a
survey of the economic and the psychological literature on this topic can be found
in Konow (2003). We wish to examine how the relative importance of equality and
e¢ ciency can depend on these factors, and which distributions are considered fair
given the type of context. Further, we are interested in assessing whether clearly
specifying the type of context helps overcome the (possible) di¤erences in judgments
between economics and sociology students and between freshmen and seniors. The
evidence that additional information facilitates the attainment of a more widespread
consensus on what is fair is an important nding for public debates1. Given that in-
1Interestingly Babcock et al. (1995) report the opposite result, i.e. adding information increases
bias. The di¤erence is that the participants in their study have a monetary incentive, so information
is employed in a biased way.
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dividualsjudgements may vary according to education, profession and age, amongst
other categories, this nding should hopefully allow progress in controversial policy
debates.
We investigated four versions of the distribution problem. The versions are all
formally identical, but each of them is characterised by a di¤erent context. In the
rst version no explanation of the di¤erence between the two individuals is provided.
The second and the third versions present two distinct explanations: in one, the sec-
ond individual is less productive because he is handicapped, in the other, because he
works less hard. The same possible allocations are present in all versions of the prob-
lem: an egalitarian, a utilitarian and a maximin allocation. Context had a signicant
e¤ect on what the subjects thought was fair and led to greater level of agreement
between the parties: the maximin allocation was preferred when the di¤erence was
due to a handicap; in case of a di¤erent e¤ort the utilitarian distribution was chosen.
People tend to favour the less productive individual when di¤erent outcomes are due
to external causes (for instance a handicap), but they will punish him if the cause is
internal (for instance for exerting less e¤ort). The two situations are perceived dif-
ferently and imply distinct reasons for allocating resources. People tend to distribute
according to need when abilities are di¤erent, and according to e¢ ciency when there
is di¤erence in e¤ort. The fourth version presents no explanation of the di¤erence
between the two individuals, but a oor is introduced in terms of minimum utility
necessary for each individual. The tension here is that the e¢ cient allocation does
not give the minimum survival utility to the less e¢ cient individual. As well as the
previous allocations, a fourth allocation is permitted, deriving from the application
of utilitarianism with a oor.
Our hypothesis is that when no explanation of the di¤erence between the indi-
viduals is provided, the subjects involuntarily insert the distribution problem into
a determined context, lling the lack of information according to their personal
attitudes and background. The preference for a particular allocation under this con-
dition will reveal the relative concern of the subject for either the e¢ ciency or the
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equality of the distribution. We will refer to such a preference as the ideologyof
the subject.
Our second purpose is to investigate the inuence of education on perception
of fairness. While a few studies have focused on di¤erences in judgement (e.g., see
Marwell and Ames, 1981; Amiel and Cowell, 1999, for a summary of their ndings),
most of the literature on the di¤erences between economists and non-economists
has concentrated on their behaviour. Several experiments have been conducted to
ascertain and to analyse any di¤erent behaviours in terms of propensity to co-operate
(through prisoners dilemma games), to free ride (for instance, in the provision of
public goods) or in the degree of selshness.
Both experiments with monetary incentives and surveys are valuable instruments
to explore fairness, according to the purpose of the analysis. Di¤erences in judgement
can be as relevant as di¤erences in behaviour, depending on the situation and the
circumstances. In daily life peoples intuitions of fairness determine not only their
behaviour but also their judgements of situations in which they are not directly
involved. People often act on unbiased views when their stakes are low or negligible,
for example as voters or in the case of juries. Further, even when personal stakes are
relatively high and agents trade-o¤self-interest and social preferences, it is interesting
to examine the fairness point against which the self-interest point is being traded o¤.
Economists participate in boards, are members of councils, vote and legislate. It is
important to analyse whether their judgements di¤er from other peoples and to what
extent this is context-related. When the purpose is to explore intuitions of fairness,
eliminating monetary stakes reduces self-interest bias and presents the advantage of
encouraging participants to prescind and abstract from personal stakes (Konow
2003, p. 1191)2.
In conducting our analysis, we will proceed as follows. Having found that an
ideological di¤erence does exist we will show that a signicant agreement can be
2See also Fong (2001).
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reached clarifying the context of the distribution. Further, we have to investigate
the reasons for this di¤erence. The literature that compares economists and non-
economists suggests that the di¤erences could be due to two causes. They may be
the result of a self-selection process or of training in economics. These two conjec-
tures have been called the selection and the learning hypothesis (Carter and Irons,
1991). Comparing the answers of freshmen students of the two courses will show
the existence of a selection e¤ect. Comparing the answers given by freshmen and
senior students of the same course, we will nd that a learning e¤ect only exists for
economics students.
In Section 1.2 we will discuss how context relates to responsibility concerns and
present the distribution mechanisms examined in our analysis. Section 1.3 reports
the results of the most prominent experiments directed to compare economists and
non-economists. In Section 1.4 we will discuss the design of the questionnaire and
the hypotheses that we are going to test. Section 1.5 displays the results. Section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 Equality, E¢ ciency and Responsibility
In any discussion of fairness and justice theories a fundamental issue is the conict
between equality and e¢ ciency. In an excellent survey on positive and normative
theories of justice James Konow (2003) examines this contrast describing the princi-
ples that are behind these concepts: the Need Principle and the E¢ ciency Principle.
The former invokes the equal satisfaction of basic needs and inspires theories such as
egalitarianism and Rawlstheory of justice (1971). The latter advocates maximising
surplus and is most closely associated with utilitarianism.
We examine the problem of how the balance between e¢ ciency and equality
is inuenced by responsibility considerations. Further we wish to verify whether
inserting the problem into a meaningful context, which clearly states who can be
held accountable for a certain outcome and who cannot, leads to a greater consensus
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on what is considered just.
The issue of responsibility has been investigated by philosophers as well as by
economists and psychologists, focusing mainly on two questions. First, how to char-
acterise responsibility and what does make a person accountable for an outcome.
The second question is related to the critique of the welfarist interpretation (see
Fleurbaey, 1998, for a survey of this literature). Welfarist theories take utilities as
the only relevant personal features. The insu¢ ciency of the welfarist framework to
capture the complexity of the distribution problem was already the main conclu-
sion reached by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and several subsequent questionnaire-
studies abandoned the welfarist perspective in their analysis (see Schokkaert and
Overlaet, 1989; Gaertner, 1994; Gaertner, Jungeilges, and Neck, 2001; Gaertner and
Jungeilges, 2002; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005,
among others). Further, there exists by now a large literature in social choice about
how to incorporate ideas of responsibility in the social evaluations (for an overview
see Fleurbaey and Maniquet, in press). Although we appreciate the importance of
this literature, we are mainly concerned with the rst question, that is the issue of
characterising responsibility. Given the goals of our analysis, we chose to adopt a
welfarist interpretation. We will therefore explore whether welfarist mechanisms may
lead to higher consensus on what is fair when the distribution problem is inserted
into a meaningful context. Further, we are interested in analysing which welfarist
distribution is preferred in di¤erent contexts.
Although a concern for individual responsibility was present in Rawls (1971) and
Sen (1980), with regards to primary goods and functionings respectively, Dworkin
(1981) has been the rst among political philosophers to explicitly focus on this is-
sue. Dworkin considers that a person must be held responsible for her preferences
whether or not they are voluntarily cultivated, as long as she identies with them,
but she cannot be held accountable for her resources. He also makes a helpful dis-
tinction between option luck, which is the output of a gamble explicitly taken,
and brute luck, which is an output in which no gamble was entered into. Thus
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option luck is a matter of choice and hence fair, while brute luck is morally arbitrary
and therefore unfair. Arneson (1989, 1990) and Cohen (1989) proposed a revision of
what Cohen (1989) called Dworkins cut, that is the division between preferences
and resources. Although they articulate their positions di¤erently, both these au-
thors agree that the right cut is between responsibility and bad luck, not between
preferences and resources (Cohen, 1989, p. 921). The debate is far from being
closed and Roemer (1993) has introduced a relativistic position, proposing that the
cut between responsibility and compensation can be seen as cultural-dependent.
Economists have analysed the importance of responsibility considerations in per-
ception of fairness through several questionnaire-studies and experiments and have
tried to single out which characteristics are considered to be within the control of
an individual and which are not (see Schokkaert and Lagrou, 1983; Schokkaert and
Overlaet, 1989; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungod-
den, 2005; Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2005, among others). A thorough review of
this literature and its relations with social psychology can be found in Konow (2003).
The author reports the results of several experiments and surveys in economics and
in psychology that indicate that individuals are held accountable for their e¤ort and
choices that a¤ect their contribution, but they are not considered responsible for
their birth, brute luck and choices that do not a¤ect their productivity. Such results
seem to conrm the predictions of attribution theory. Attribution theory is a social
psychology theory initiated by Heider (1958) that explains behaviour on the basis of
causal attributions of responsibility. According to this theory, people infer causes of
events and evaluate to what extent an agent has contributed to the outcome, holding
the agent responsible only for those factors that the agent can inuence. As Konow
(2003) suggests attribution theory provides a powerful criterion for describing desert
according to the views of most people(p. 1214).
In our empirical investigation, we build a distribution problem such that the the-
ories inspired by the Need Principle advocate allocations of resources substantially
di¤erent from the distribution that would result if the E¢ ciency Principle was ap-
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plied. In the base treatment, where the context of the problem is not claried, it
is not clear what the di¤erent productivity of the two individuals depends on. We
then examine two classes of context, which ll the gap of information and enable
the subjects to establish whether the agents can or cannot be held accountable for
their productivity. In one the di¤erent productivity is explained in terms of brute
luck, a factor that is out of the control of the individuals; in the other it depends
on e¤ort, an element that they can control. Following Konow (2000) we will refer
to exogenous di¤erences in the rst case and discretionary di¤erences in the
second. Finally we consider a version of the distribution problem in which need
considerations are involved; this treatment is identical to the rst one except for the
introduction of a threshold under which the individuals do not survive.
Let us consider the distribution mechanisms that will be examined in our analysis.
Besides the Egalitarian solution we are going to consider three other distribution
mechanisms, whose application may determine particular departures from equality.
Let us examine these distribution principles.
Many di¤erent forms of utilitarianism exist, but we will refer to it as the principle
that advocates the maximisation of the sum of individual utilities.
Rawls(1971) theory of justice was conceived as an alternative to utilitarianism,
in all of its forms, and has become a powerful contestant to utilitarian theory in
recent years. Rawls proposes two principles of justice that are meant to rule the basic
structure of society and determine the division of advantages of social cooperation.
The above principles would result from a social contract made by rational individuals
behind a veil of ignorance, which would guarantee the impartiality of the parties.
While the rst principle rules the scheme of liberties each person has the right to, the
second principle determines which social and economic inequalities are acceptable.
The distribution mechanism we are interested in is what Rawls refers to as the
maximin equity criterion, which came subsequently to be known as the di¤erence
principle. It is identiable with the rst part of the second principle, which is dened
as following: Social and economic inequalities are to meet two conditions: they
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must be (a) to the greatest expected benet of the least advantaged members of
society (the maximin equity criterion) and (b) attached to o¢ ces and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.(Rawls, 1974, p. 142). This
criterion is clearly opposed to the utilitarian that only cares about maximising utility
regardless of its distribution.
Finally, utilitarianism with a oor is a mechanism that prescribes the maximi-
sation of the average utility with a oor constraint. Preferences for distributions
prescribed by the application of this principle have been tested in several experi-
ments (e.g. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy, 1987a, 1987b; Lissowsky, Tyszka, and
Okrasa, 1991).
Rawlstheory of justices informational basis does not coincide with the utilitar-
ian. In the utilitarian theory the informational basis consists only of the utilities
of the individuals in the states of a¤airs under evaluation. Rawls theory, on the
contrary, ranks the di¤erent states of a¤airs according to the distribution of primary
goods, that are dened as anything any rational person wants and will want regard-
less of his plan of life or his place in the social scheme. As we mentioned above we are
going to consider all of the distribution mechanisms discussed, including the max-
imin criterion, from a welfarist perspective. Among the welfarist theories, Sen (1992)
recalls the utility-based maximin as that distribution mechanism that prescribes to
maximise the utility of the least advantaged individual. This is the interpretation
that we are going to assume in the course of our analysis.
1.3 Are Economists Di¤erent?
Most of the literature on the di¤erences between economists and non-economists has
concentrated on di¤erences in behaviour. Amiel and Cowell (1999) summarise some
of their ndings on the di¤erent moral intuitions of economists and non-economists.
They focused mainly on the acceptance of the monotonicity axiom, a concept which
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is very close to the Pareto principle3. Their results show that the monotonicity axiom
was not a very popular concept. However, it was generally accepted more favourably
by economics students than by their sociologist colleagues.
Marwell and Ames (1981) conducted the rst study that compared economists
and non-economists, through an experiment that called for private contributions to
public goods. They found that rst-year graduate students in economics are much
more likely than others to free ride. They conjectured that there might be two
reasons for why economists might behave di¤erently, dened by Carter and Irons
(1991) as the selection and the learning hypothesis. However, Marwell and Ames
did not check the extent to which this di¤erence is due to one hypothesis or the
other (or to both of them). Further, they collected a wide range of information
regarding the di¤erent perceptions, expectations and explanations for the behaviour
of the subjects. Two questions were asked. First, what is a fair investment in
the public good? 75 percent of the non-economists answered half or moreof the
endowment, and 25 percent answered all. The other question asked whether they
were concerned about fairness in making their own investment decision. Almost all
non-economists answered yes. The answers of the economics students were more
di¢ cult to analyse. More than one-third of them either refused to answer the rst
question or gave uncodable responses. As Marwell and Ames wrote, it seems that
the meaning of fairnessin this context was somewhat alien for this group(Marwell
and Ames, 1981, p. 309). Those who did answer found that little or no contribution
was fair. With regard to the second question, economics students were much less
concerned with fairness when making their decisions.
Carter and Irons (1991) investigated the behaviour of students of economics com-
pared to students of other disciplines in an ultimatum bargaining game. They found
that economics students behaved more self-interestedly than other students. They
tested the selection and the learning hypothesis, nding that economists are born,
3While the Pareto criterion is expressed in terms of utility the monotonicity axiom is usually
put in terms of personsincomes(Amiel and Cowell, 1999, p. 64).
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not made(Carter and Irons, 1991, p. 174). They claimed that studying economics
does not create rational, self-interested homines economici, but subjects who are
particularly concerned with economic incentives self-select into economics. Using a
prisoners dilemma game, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) found that economists
behave in more self-interested ways and are much more likely to defect from coali-
tions. Further, their results support the learning hypothesis. According to them,
exposure to the self-interest model does in fact encourage self-interested behavior
(Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993, p. 159) and inhibit co-operation.
Yezer, Goldfarb, and Poppen (1996) strongly criticised the results obtained by
Frank and his coauthors (1993) from a methodological point of view. They claimed
that the evidence of that paper only implies that economics students display uncoop-
erative behaviour in specialised games. They conducted a lost-letterexperiment, in
which envelopes containing currency are dropped in classrooms before the beginning
of the lectures. The return rate on lost letters is used as a measure of co-operation.
According to their results, the real lifebehaviour of economics students is actually
more co-operative than that of subjects studying other disciplines. Similarly, Frey
and Meier (2003) claim that students may play the equilibrium learned in their eco-
nomics classes, but they do not apply it to real life situations(Frey and Meier, 2003,
p. 448). Further, their results indicate that the particular behaviour of economists
is only due to self-selection. On the basis of Yezers results, Zsolnai (2003) suggests
that there might be no contradiction between honesty and co-operation, which are
two di¤erent qualities, and claims that economists behaviour is characterised by
respect for property rights and self-interest motivation simultaneously. Finally, Hu
and Liu (2003) found evidence that economics students are more likely to co-operate
in prisoners dilemma games.
In sum, the results are inconclusive and depend on the di¤erent settings. Further,
most of these studies are aimed to test whether economics students behave more in
accordance with predictions of the rational/self-interest model of economics. How-
ever, despite the di¤erent approach assumed in this work, it will be useful, in the
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course of our analysis, to compare the above results with ours, taking into account
the di¤erent perspectives assumed.
1.4 Methods and Hypotheses
In March 2002, a total of 1333 students of the University of Milan took part in
the survey. 661 of them were sociology students, 345 freshmen and 316 seniors.
The remaining 672 were economics students, 354 freshmen and 318 seniors. In each
of the four groups women and men were present in approximately equal number.
Regarding these groups there are two important points to make. First, nobody,
among the freshmen, had studied economics in the previous years of school. Second,
the freshmen of economics had not started economic topics yet, having only studied
mathematics, statistics and law courses. Participation was voluntary and all those
asked to participate agreed to do so. There was no show-up fee paid. Each student
was given a sheet containing on the front the base problem and on the back, at
random, one of the remaining three problems. Thus, each of the four groups was
divided into three classes, according to the nature of the second question. Students
were asked to read the question on the front and only after answering that they could
read and answer the one on the back. It was not possible to change the answer to
the rst problem after reading the second one. The total time for conducting the
questionnaire, including our instructions, varied between 20 and 25 minutes, due to
the di¤erence in class sizes.
The four questions are reported in Appendix 1A. We will refer to them as ques-
tion 1 (base treatment), question 2a (exogenous di¤erence treatment), question 2b
(discretionary di¤erence treatment) and question 2c (need treatment). All of the
respondents answered question 1. 464 students answered question 2a; of them, 124
were economics freshmen, 115 economics seniors, 134 sociology freshmen and 91
sociology seniors. Question 2b was submitted to 451 respondents: 129 economics
freshmen, 109 economics seniors, 95 sociology freshmen and 118 sociology seniors.
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Finally, a total of 418 students answered question 2c; of them, 101 were economics
freshmen, 94 economics seniors, 116 sociology freshmen and 107 sociology seniors.
As previously noted, the four problems are formally identical. Resources are to be
distributed between two individuals. Robinson and Friday live on two di¤erent is-
lands. Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B. On each island one
can till 12 plants. Utility deriving from the goods is increasing and marginal utility
is constant4. The two characters obtain di¤erent levels of utility from the goods, and
are only interested in the utility they get.
The only reason why both Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these
plants is because they produce fruit, and the higher amount of fruit they obtain the
more their welfare would be; every additional fruit produces an equal value, which
is identical for both people.
The respondents are asked to choose a solution among the ones that are provided
so that the distribution is just, recalling that there is no possibility of redistributing
the plants after the allocation. In question 1 no explanation of the di¤erence between
the individuals is provided.
Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot
obtain any fruit from island As plants.
On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.
In question 2a and question 2b the di¤erence between the individuals is explained.
In the former the two individuals di¤er in their physical abilities, an exogenous
di¤erence.
Both Robinson and Friday put the same amount of work into tilling the
plants; the only way to move from one island to the other is to swim.
4With an assumption of constant marginal utility, utilitarianism amounts to maximising the
sum of resources. It is worth noting that this is only a simplied form of welfarism.
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Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he cannot
swim and he cannot till any plant on island A.
Robinson is a perfect swimmer and he can therefore till plants on both islands,
but due to a wound caused by the shipwreck he cannot obtain more than 20 fruits
per year from every plant of island A and island B.
In question 2b Robinson and Friday put in di¤erent e¤orts in tilling their plants,
which is a discretionary di¤erence.
Robinson and Friday can till plants and move from one island to the other in
the same way, but they do not put the same amount of work into tilling the
plants.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he doesnt
want to go on island A and he will not produce fruits on this island.
To Robinson moving from one island to the other is all the same, but he does
not put as much amount of work into tilling his plants as Friday and he
doesnt produce more than 20 fruits per year from every plant, both on island A and
B.5
Question 2c introduces need considerations. No explanation is provided, but a
minimum level of utility is introduced.
The minimum quantity needed by every one of them in order to survive is
300 fruits per year.
The distributions are provided in terms of resources as well as in terms of utility;
the sum of utility obtained by the individuals is shown too. Three solutions are
provided to question 1, 2a and 2b.
5The idea of the two islands and, in particular, the fact that Friday works harder but does not
want to go to the other island is an unnecessary complication, which we realise could have been
avoided.
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                             
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
                             
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
                             
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
                             
The rst solution derives from the application of the utilitarian principle, the
second one is the maximin solution, while the third one is the Egalitarian. The
Utilitarian solution is the fairest in terms of resources, (R: 12-0; F: 0-12): each
individual receives all of the plants of his island. However, this distribution is the
most unequal in terms of utility: (R: 240; F: 1440). Social welfare, though, is
maximised. The Rawlsian distribution is much more unequal in terms of resources,
(R: 12-8; F: 0-4): Robinson receives 8 of the 12 plants of island B, besides the
12 plants of island A. Welfare distribution is much more equal, though, (R: 400;
F: 480). The cost of this greater equity is a much lower total welfare. Finally, the
Egalitarian distribution gives every individual a utility of 360, distributing the plants
as follows: (R: 9-9; F: 3-3). Total welfare is much less than according to the other
allocations. Only the Utilitarian and the Rawlsian solutions are Pareto-e¢ cient.
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Applying the maximin solution both the individuals are better o¤ than under the
Egalitarian distribution, which is not Pareto-e¢ cient. Besides these distributions a
fourth solution6, corresponding to utilitarianism with a oor, is provided to question
2c.
                             
4 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 3 300
Friday 0 9 1080
Total production of fruits 1380
                             
Plants are divided as follows: (R: 12-3; F: 0-9). Robinson gets 300 fruits, just
enough to survive, and Friday gets a utility of 1080. This distribution is also Pareto-
e¢ cient and, in terms of utility, stands between the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian.
The latter is the only one that does not guarantee the survival of both the individuals.
We explore ve hypotheses.
1. Selection hypothesis. We are interested in testing whether students choosing
to study economics and students choosing to study sociology di¤er in their
ideology. In order to test this hypothesis we are going to compare the answers
of freshmen of economics and sociology to question 1.
2. Learning hypothesis. We wish to test whether education inuences ideology.
To test this hypothesis we are going to compare the answers to question 1 given
by freshmen and seniors of the same course.
3. Transformation of ideological di¤erences. We are going to test whether ideo-
logical di¤erences increase with the seniority of the subjects. This hypothesis
6An extension to this study might be the inclusion of the utilitarian solution with a oor in the
rst three treatments. It would also be interesting to combine the idea of a minimum quantity with
the explanations from questions 2a and 2b. However, we believe these not to be crucial points of
our analysis.
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will be tested by comparing the answers to question 1 given by senior students
of economics and sociology.
4. Relevance of exogenous di¤erences / discretionary di¤erences / need. We are
going to test whether contexts a¤ect the preferences of the respondents. We
will consider each class separately and test the hypothesis of no change in the
answer to the rst and the second question.
5. Agreement hypothesis. Finally, we will compare the answers of the four groups
to questions 2a, 2b and 2c, and test whether clarifying the context or intro-
ducing a minimum utility allows reaching an agreement between the groups.
1.5 Results
In presenting our results we will proceed as follows. First, we will focus on the dif-
ference between economics and sociology students, testing the selection and learning
hypotheses. Then, we will analyse the e¤ects of clarifying the context of the distri-
bution and the extent to which this facilitates an agreement between the parties.7
7Before proceeding to test the above hypotheses we have to make sure that in each group the
three di¤erent versions of the questionnaire have been randomly distributed among the respondents.
For each group, we have to check that the answers to the rst question follow the same distribution
in everyone of the three classes. For each one of the four groups, we apply the Chi-square test to
test the following hypothesis
H0 : the proportion of subjects in each of the option
categories is the same in each of the three classes.
The value of the test statistic is 2 = 0:55 for economics freshmen (p = 0.9685), 2 = 3:38 for
economics seniors (p = 0.4963), 2 = 0:72 for sociology freshmen (p = 0.9488) and 2 = 2:98 for
sociology seniors (p = 0.5612). For every group we cannot reject the null hypothesis. This allows




Table 1.1 reports the answers to question 1. In the tables and gures we will present,
E, R, U and UF indicate, respectively, Egalitarian, Rawlsian, Utilitarian and Utili-
tarian with a oor.










E 35 22 47 47
R 38 50 37 34
U 27 28 16 19
Let us consider the answers to question 1 given by the freshmen of economics
and sociology rst. This will allow us to test the selection hypothesis. We can easily
notice a consistent di¤erence between the two distributions, the preferences of the
economics students being more equally distributed between the three options. In
both the groups there are a similar percentage of subjects choosing the Rawlsian
principle, 38 percent of the economics students and 37 percent of the sociology ones.
However, while 47 percent of the sociologists prefer the Egalitarian solution and only
16 percent the Utilitarian, these percentages are much closer among the economists,
respectively 35 percent and 27 percent.
Selection hypothesis (1.1)
H0 : the choice of a particular option
is unrelated to the university course.
Given the value of the test statistic, 2 = 15:57, we reject the null hypothesis (p
= 0.0004). This leads to the following result.
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Result 1.1: A selection e¤ect does exist. Sociology students are
more concerned with equality than economics students and prefer the
Egalitarian distribution despite its ine¢ ciency.
1.5.2 Education: Equity and E¢ ciency
We are going to analyse whether education inuences ideology by comparing the
answers to question 1 given by freshmen and seniors of the same discipline. Table
1.1 shows that the answers of the economics seniors are much more di¤erentiated than
those of their younger colleagues. The percentage of preferences for the Utilitarian
allocation is almost identical in both the groups (27 percent among the freshmen
and 28 percent among the seniors). However the preferences for the Egalitarian
distribution diminish from the freshmen (35 percent) to the seniors (22 percent) to
the advantage of the maximin principle. On the other hand, interestingly, we notice
that the distributions of preferences of sociology freshmen and seniors are almost
identical.
Learning hypothesis (1.2)
H0 : the choice of a particular option is
unrelated to the university year.
We reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.0003) with respect to the economics students
(2 = 15:88), but we cannot reject it (p = 0.61569) for the sociology ones (2 = 0:97).
This leads to the next result.
Result 1.2: A learning e¤ect only exists for the economics students.
The Egalitarian solution is less popular with economics seniors, who in-
stead prefer the Rawlsian distribution.
Unlike Carter and Irons (1991), we can therefore conclude that economists are
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not only born, but also made. Our results also seem to contradict the results obtained
by Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993). They found that economics students appear
to be more prone than others to defect, that is to go for the Pareto-inferior solu-
tion, and this trend increases with the seniority of the subjects. They claimed that
training in economics has, amongst others, negative consequences, i.e. anti-social
behaviour (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1996). Our results indicate the presence of
a learning e¤ect that reects an increasing appreciation for the maximin principle.
The latter does satisfy the Pareto criterion8, which is not the case for the Egalitarian
distribution. However, the shift in preferences is not at all in the direction of the
Utilitarian solution, which suggests that senior students are no more concerned with
the maximisation of output than their younger colleagues. Given that senior stu-
dents of economics are more likely to favour inequality only if this implies making
both the individuals better o¤, training in economics does not seem to have negative
consequences.
However, we have to bear in mind the di¤erences between the experiments we
discussed in Section 1.3 and our study. Carter and Irons (1991) and Frank and his
colleagues (1993) were interested in nding whether exposure to the rational model
of economics makes subjects behave in a more self-interested way. Our approach
di¤ers in two ways. First, we concentrate our analysis on the perception of fairness
of the subjects rather than on their behaviour. Second, self-interest bias is drastically
reduced by the elimination of monetary incentives9.
8It is interesting to notice that several studies show that the Pareto principle is not a very
popular concept with economics and business students (e.g. McClelland and Rohrbaugh, 1978;
Amiel and Cowell, 1999). However, non-economists seem to believe in it even less (Amiel and
Cowell, 1999).
9Note that self-interest bias cannot be completely eliminated. Although the respondents have
to divide the resources between two hypothetical individuals, they might still act as vicarious
stakeholders.
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1.5.3 Does Education Increase Ideological Di¤erences?
We want to check whether ideological di¤erences between the students of the two
courses increase with the di¤erent education or remain stable. Looking at Table 1.1
we can see that the di¤erence between the two distributions seems to have increased
from the rst to the last year. Let us test the hypothesis of transformation of
ideological di¤erences. The null hypothesis is the same as Hypothesis (1.1). The
value of the test statistic is 2 = 44:5 and we reject the null hypothesis (p = 2.177e-
10). Moreover, the Cramer coe¢ cient10 shows that the ideological di¤erence between
the seniors of the two courses is much greater than between their younger colleagues.
Result 1.3: The ideological di¤erence between senior students of
economics and sociology is greater than between the freshmen of the two
courses.
1.5.4 The Impact of Context
Table 1.2 reports the answers to the three di¤erent versions of question 2. Unlike
the base version, in the exogenous di¤erence treatment the absolute majority of each
group prefer the Rawlsian solution. This trend can be understood if we consider that
both the individuals exert the same e¤ort, but they di¤er in their physical abilities,
a characteristic they cannot be held responsible for. Maximising the utility of the
more disadvantaged is considered fair by most of the individuals, whatever group
they belong to.
In the case of discretionary di¤erences, the Utilitarian solution is the most pre-
ferred by each one of the four groups. This result is even more striking considering
that utilitarianism was the least preferred solution to the rst problem by three of
10The Cramer coe¢ cient measures the degree of relation between two sets of variables. The value
of this coe¢ cient almost doubles passing from the freshermens sample to the seniorsone, from
0:15 to 0:27, indicating a much stronger relation between the preferences of the senior students and
the course attended.
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the four groups and only the second choice of the economics seniors. The two indi-
viduals are held accountable for their outcomes when they di¤er in their e¤ort. The
Utilitarian solution, which rewards the character that puts in more e¤ort, is preferred
to the other allocations in each group. The answers to this problem are even more
homogenous then those to question 2a. The four classes present the same order of
preferences: the maximin solution is the second choice, followed by the Egalitarian.










2a E 15 7 25 32
(exogenous) R 63 76 60 60
U 22 17 15 8
2b E 12 6 13 14
(discretionary) R 34 28 38 36
U 54 66 49 50
2c E 30 19 41 36
(need) R 41 44 44 32
U 4 1 0 3
UF 26 36 15 30
Need seems the most obvious force driving the results on question 2c. Economics
freshmen and seniors and sociology freshmen prefer the maximin solution, while
among the sociology seniors egalitarianism is still the rst choice. The four groups
share the same scepticism for the Utilitarian solution, which does not guarantee the
survival of the more disadvantaged individual. Egalitarianism still proves to be more
appreciated by the sociology students; however, even among them, the preferences for
the Egalitarian solution decrease from freshmen to seniors in favour of utilitarianism
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with a oor. The latter seems to exert a particular attraction on more mature
students, whatever course they attend.
In order to analyse the relevance of context we are going to compare the answers
given by each student to the rst and the second question, anlysing rst problem 2a
and 2b and then problem 2c. The results of all the tests of di¤erences are reported
in Appendix 1B.
Concerning those subjects who received question 2a and those who received ques-
tion 2b, we can test the signicance of the change in their preferences by applying
the Stuart-Maxwell test11.
Relevance of exogenous / discretionary di¤erences (1.3)
H0 : there is no change in the preferences of the
subjects passing from the rst to the second problem.
In each case we can reject the null hypothesis. This leads to the following result:
Result 1.4: Introducing either exogenous or discretionary di¤erences
has changed the preferences of the subjects, whatever group they belong
to.
With reference to both classes of each of the four groups, we can look for those
single categories for which the di¤erences are signicant. We can collapse the orig-
inal 3x3 tables into 2x2 tables12 and apply the McNemar test to three di¤erent
11The Stuart-Maxwell test is a variation of McNemars test appropriate for case-control compar-
isons involving 3x3 contingency tables. It can be used to test marginal homogeneity between two
raters across all categories simultaneously ( for a general discussion see Fleiss, 1981).
12In these 2x2 tables the answers to the rst and to the second question will be categorised




H0 : among the respondents who change their (1.4)
preference, the probability that a respondent
will switch from E (R / U) to not E (not R /
not U) will be the same as the probability that
a respondent will change from not E (not R /
not U) to E (R / U).
In the case of exogenous di¤erences, for each of the four groups we reject the
null hypothesis concerning the Egalitarian and the maximin allocation. Once it
is explained that the lower productivity of one of the two characters is due to a
handicap the consent for the Egalitarian solution diminishes, while more subjects
are in favour of the Rawlsian allocation. Furthermore, considering the economics
seniors, we can also reject the null hypothesis concerning the Utilitarian distribution,
which is preferred by fewer subjects as a solution to problem 2a.
Result 1.5: With the introduction of exogenous di¤erences, the pref-
erences of each group for the Egalitarian distribution have decreased in
favour of the maximin solution. The preferences of the economics se-
niors for both the Egalitarian and Utilitarian solutions have diminished
in favour of the maximin one.
Let us consider the discretionary di¤erence treatment. For each of the four groups
we reject the null hypothesis concerning the Egalitarian and Utilitarian solutions.
When the di¤erent productivity is explained in terms of e¤ort the preferences for the
Egalitarian distribution decrease, while more people prefer the Utilitarian allocation.
Considering the economics seniors, we reject the null concerning each of the three
options: the preferences for the maximin and the Egalitarian distribution diminish
from the rst to the second problem, in favour of the Utilitarian allocation.
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Result 1.6: With the introduction of discretionary di¤erences, the
preferences of each group for the Egalitarian distribution have decreased
in favour of the Utilitarian solution. The preferences of the economics
seniors for both the Egalitarian and maximin solutions have diminished
in favour of the Utilitarian one.
As revealed by these results, passing from the rst to the second question has
signicantly lowered the consent for the Egalitarian solution among all the groups.
This leads to an important result:
Result 1.7: The ine¢ cient allocation seems to be an inadequate
solution to the problem, once the circumstances of the distribution are
clear.
Let us nally test the hypothesis of relevance of need with respect to the subjects
who received question 2c13. For each group we can reject the null hypothesis with
reference to the Utilitarian solution. Need considerations have driven the preferences
for the latter to drastically fall in every group. In addition, considering the senior
students we reject the null concerning two other mechanisms: the egalitarian with
respect to the sociology seniors, and the maximin with reference to the seniors of eco-
nomics. The two groups show much less consent for these principles when answering
question 2c.
Result 1.8: With the introduction of a threshold, the preferences of
each group for the Utilitarian distribution have drastically fallen. More-
over, the preferences of the sociology seniors for the Egalitarian alloca-
tion have decreased, while the maximin solution is preferred by fewer
economics seniors.
13While the rst problem presents three solutions, four distinct distributions are provided as
possible solutions to question 2c. The Stuart-Maxwell test cannot be used to test marginal homo-
geneity in this case and, furthermore, no appropriate test for case-control comparisons involving























































Comparing the results reported in Table 1.1 with Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we can
intuitively infer that when either exogenous or discretionary di¤erences are intro-
duced the answers of the four groups are much more similar. In the base treatment
sociology students preferred the Egalitarian solution to the Rawlsian, and the latter
to the Utilitarian. Economics seniors strongly preferred the Rawlsian distribution
to the Utilitarian, and the Utilitarian to the Egalitarian. Finally, among economics
freshmen the percentage of preferences for the maximin allocation was slightly higher
than for the Egalitarian, and the latter was preferred to the Utilitarian distribution.
Let us conclude our analysis investigating whether clarifying the context of the dis-
tribution leads to a common solution accepted by the parties.
Agreement hypothesis (1.5)
H0 : the proportion of subjects in each of
the option categories is the same in
each group
Let us rst consider the case of exogenous di¤erences. The value of the test sta-
tistic is 2 = 29:21 and we reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.00005): although in each
of the four groups the absolute majority prefer the Rawlsian solution, the prefer-
ences of the four groups do not follow the same distribution. We can test Hypothesis
(1.5) with reference to four di¤erent cases: economics and sociology freshmen, eco-
nomics and sociology seniors, economics freshmen and seniors, sociology freshmen
and seniors. We reject the null (p = 0.00001) only concerning economics and soci-
ology seniors, given the high Chi-square value, 2 = 22:9. We cannot reject it in
the other cases. Testing the hypothesis with economics and sociology freshmen we
have 2 = 4:49 (p = 0.1059). Testing it with economics freshmen and seniors the
Chi-square value is 2 = 5:68 (p = 0.0584). In the case of sociology freshmen and
seniors the result is 2 = 3:39 (p = 0.1836). Let us make two interesting points.
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In comparison to the answers to question 1, the di¤erences between economics and
sociology freshmen and between economics freshmen and seniors have drastically
diminished14. Let us summarise these results.
Result 1.9: When exogenous di¤erences are introduced, the absolute
majority of every group prefer the maximin principle as a solution to the
problem. In addition, the di¤erence due to the selection e¤ect as well as
the disagreement between economics freshmen and seniors has decreased.
In the case of discretionary di¤erences, testing Hypothesis (1.5) with respect to
all the groups the value of the test statistic is 2 = 8:5. We cannot reject the
hypothesis according to which the preferences of the four groups follow the same
distribution (p = 0.2037). The answers to this question conrm the results obtained
in the literature on di¤erences in e¤ort (see Konow, 2003, for an overview).
Result 1.10: The preferences of the four groups with respect to the
problem with discretionary di¤erences follow the same distribution. The
Utilitarian allocation is the most preferred, the maximin solution is the
second choice and the Egalitarian is the least preferred.
Finally, we consider the need version of the distribution problem. Testing Hypoth-
esis (1.5) with reference to the four groups the value of the test statistic is 2 = 26:5
and we have to reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.0017). The only case in which we
cannot reject it (p = 0.1316) is comparing the answers of the economics freshmen
and seniors, 2 = 5:62. With respect to them, we can conclude that their preferences
follow the same distribution. Unlike other experiments (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and
Eavy, 1987a, 1987b; Lissowsky, Tyszka, and Okrasa, 1991), the introduction of a
oor did not enable a solution accepted by all of the parties. However, we notice
14Note that although the p-values are higher than 0.05, they are still close (especially in the case
of economics freshmen and seniors).
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that an agreement looks closer now than in the rst problem. Three groups prefer
the Rawlsian solution and even among the sociology seniors the percentage of pref-
erences for the maximin allocation is very close to the rst choice. The solution we
proposed according to utilitarianism with a oor only guarantees the survival of the
least advantaged character. That did not look enough to most of the subjects, who
instead preferred maximising his utility. An interesting extension would be to test
whether solutions with an intermediate oor would lead to greater consensus. The
following summarises these results.
Result 1.11: In the need treatment all of the groups, except for
the sociology seniors, prefer the maximin allocation as a solution to the
question, while the utilitarian distribution is by far the least preferred
by each group. Utilitarianism with a oor is more preferred by senior
students.
1.6 Conclusions
Several studies have been conducted to analyse whether judgments of fairness are
context dependent. To our knowledge, though, this is the rst attempt to explore
distributive justice analysing the extent to which clarifying the context of a distri-
bution favours greater consensus on what is just. We surveyed rst and last year
undergraduate students of economics and sociology, focusing on contextual factors
related to responsibility and need considerations. Let us summarise the main results
we obtained.
A selection e¤ect does exist. The ideology of students choosing to study sociology
di¤ers from that of students who choose to study economics, the former group being
much more concerned about equality. Further, the di¤erences in ideology increase
with the seniority of the subjects. Economics seniors show a higher appreciation of
the Pareto principle than their younger colleagues, which is not the case with sociol-
ogy students (with reference to this point see also Amiel and Cowell, 1999, although
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the authors do not distinguish between selection and learning e¤ects). However,
training in economics does not seem to inuence the concern for the maximisation
of total output. These results cannot be directly compared to most of the literature
about the di¤erences between economists and non-economists, these studies being
aimed to analyse whether students of economics behave in a more self-interested
way than students of other disciplines. In any case, unlike the results obtained by
Marwell and Ames (1981), our results indicate that even economics students have
an interest in fairness. This may be due to the di¤erent design of the question.
Clarifying the context of the distribution, by either explaining the di¤erences
between the individuals or introducing a minimum survival utility, signicantly in-
uences perception of fairness of the subjects, whatever group they belong to. When-
ever it is not e¢ cient, the egalitarian principle seems to provide inadequate solutions
if the circumstances of the distributions are clear. Need considerations seem to drive
the results when a oor is introduced: the utilitarian principle is abandoned, if the
solution it prescribes does not enable every individual to reach the minimum utility.
Interestingly sociology seniors develop an increased preference for utilitarianism with
a oor relative to sociology freshmen.
The most notable result is that clarifying the context favours greater consensus
on what is fair. The maximin criterion proves to be an adequate solution to the
distribution problem when exogenous di¤erences, for which the individuals cannot
be held responsible, are introduced. The utilitarian principle, on the contrary, meets
a great success when the individuals put in di¤erent e¤orts (discretionary di¤erences).
The introduction of a oor does not seem to be an equally successful way to achieve a
social agreement. However, only a particular solution corresponding to the utilitarian
principle with a oor constraint has been explored. There are several interesting
extensions for future research and a series of social experiments should be conducted




After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di¤erent islands
divided by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce
fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be;
every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the
plants between Robinson and Friday. Youve been given the following information,
which the two survivors also know:
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B.
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much
fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot
obtain any fruit from island As plants.
On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.
Theres no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and theres
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
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                             
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
                             
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
                             
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
                             
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Question 2a
After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di¤erent islands
divided by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce
fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be;
every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the
plants between Robinson and Friday.
Youve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know:
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B.
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much
fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Both Robinson and Friday put the same amount of work into tilling
the plants; the only way to move from one island to the other is to swim.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he cannot
swim and he cannot till any plant on island A.
Robinson is a perfect swimmer and he can therefore till plants on both islands,
but due to a wound caused by the shipwreck he cannot obtain more than 20 fruits
per year from every plant of island A and island B.
Theres no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and theres
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
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                             
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
                             
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
                             
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
                             
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Question 2b
After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di¤erent islands
divided by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce
fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be;
every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the
plants between Robinson and Friday.
Youve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know:
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B.
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much
fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Robinson and Friday can till plants and move from one island to the
other in the same way, but they do not put the same amount of work into
tilling the plants.
Friday can obtain 120 fruits per year from every plant of island B, but he doesnt
want to go on island A and he will not produce fruits on this island.
To Robinson moving from one island to the other is all the same, but he does not
put as much amount of work into tilling his plants as Friday and he doesnt produce
more than 20 fruits per year from every plant, both on island A and B.
Theres no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and theres
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
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                             
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
                             
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
                             
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
                             
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Question 2c
After a shipwreck Robinson and Friday have landed on two di¤erent islands
divided by a narrow but deep channel.
On each of the two islands one can till 12 plants. The only reason why both
Robinson and Friday would like to cultivate these plants is because they produce
fruit and the higher amount of fruit they obtain, the more their welfare would be;
every additional fruit produces an equal value, which is identical for both people.
It has been decided that you are the one who will chose how to distribute the
plants between Robinson and Friday.
Youve been given the following information, which the two survivors also know:
The minimum quantity needed by every one of them in order to survive
is 300 fruits per year.
Robinson lives on island A and Friday lives on island B
All plants of one island are identical to the ones of the other island. How much
fruit they produce depends on the way they are cultivated.
Friday obtains 120 fruits per year from every plant on island B, but he cannot
obtain any fruit from island As plants.
On both islands Robinson obtains 20 fruits per plant.
Theres no possibility of redistributing the plants after the allocation and theres
also no chance to exchange any fruit, which is produced.
How would you divide the 12 plants of island A and the 12 plants of island B so
that, from your point of view, the distribution would be just?
Choose:
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                             
1 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 0 240
Friday 0 12 1440
Total production of fruits 1680
                             
2 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 8 400
Friday 0 4 480
Total production of fruits 880
                             
3 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 9 9 360
Friday 3 3 360
Total production of fruits 720
                             
4 Plants island A Plants island B Fruits
Robinson 12 3 300
Friday 0 9 1080
Total production of fruits 1380
                             
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Appendix 1B
We report the Chi-square values resulting from testing Hypotheses (1.3) and (1.4).
The numbers in brackets represent the p-values.
Table 1.3 reports the results of the application of the Stuart-Maxwell tests to
Hypothesis (1.3).



























The following tables report the results of the application of the McNemar tests to
Hypothesis (1.4) with respect to economics freshmen, economics seniors, sociology
freshmen and sociology seniors.
Table 1.4: Economics Freshmen (McNemar tests)























Table 1.5: Economics Seniors (McNemar tests)






















Table 1.6: Sociology Freshmen (McNemar tests)






















Table 1.7. Sociology Seniors (McNemar tests)
























The Important Thing Is not
(Always) Winning but Taking
Part: Funding Public Goods with
Contests
2.1 Introduction
This paper looks at multiple prize contests as a way to overcome the free-riding
problem. It is well known that the public good provision resulting from individual
voluntary contributions is generally sub-optimal, because of the incentive to free-
ride associated with positive externalities (e.g. see Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni,
1988a). While fund-raising mechanisms based on tax rewards and penalties can be
designed to solve this problem (e.g. Groves and Ledyard, 1977; Walker, 1981), they
are not available to private organisations with no coercive power, such as charities or
civic groups. Contests as incentive mechanisms are di¤erent from the above solutions
because no power to enforce sanctions is required on the part of the institution con-
ducting the tournament. Contests are competitions in which agents spend resources
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in order to win one or more prizes. The main characteristic is that, independently
of success, all participants bear some costs.
A number of recent studies have explored di¤erent incentive based fund-raising
mechanisms both theoretically and through laboratory experiments. These studies
have focused on the use of lotteries (e.g. Morgan, 2000; Morgan and Sefton, 2000),
the comparison between winner-pay and all-pay auctions with one prize (e.g. Goeree
et al., 2005) and between lotteries and one prize all-pay auctions (e.g. Orzen, 2005).
Morgan (2000) studies a lottery mechanism where one prize is awarded as a way
to overcome the free-riding problem. Contributions to the public good entitle to
lottery tickets, one ticket is randomly drawn and the holder wins the prize. The
public good consists of the revenue of the lottery net of the value of the prize. He
considers a model with quasilinear preferences where all players contribute the same
amount in equilibrium, independently of their income.
Goeree et al. (2005) compare the results of a winner-pay and an all-pay auction
with one prize with a lottery. They study a public good game with a linear production
function where agents are unconstrained and have heterogeneous preferences which
are private information. The authors show that the all-pay auction dominates both
the other mechanisms.
The puzzle with the equilibrium dened in Morgan (2000) is that it predicts
that agents with di¤erent incomes contribute the same amount. This pattern does
not seem to properly describe reality, while it seems more plausible that individu-
als with higher incomes contribute more than what poorer ones do1. On the other
hand, Goeree et al. (2005) do not explore the behaviour of agents with heteroge-
neous endowments. Contrary to these analyses, in the present study we identify
an equilibrium in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment.
Furthermore, although there exists a large literature which analyses the use of mul-
1Interestingly, so far experiments on lotteries as a way to nance public goods have only focused
on the case of subjects with homogeneous endowments (see, for instance, Morgan and Sefton, 2000;
Orzen, 2005).
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tiple prize contests and tournaments as incentive schemes2, their use as fund-raising
mechanisms has not been explored.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study a multiple prize contest where unconstrained
agents di¤er in the ability to exert e¤ort, and the ability is private information.
They show that when costs are either linear or concave allocating only one prize
maximises the total expected e¤ort exerted by the bidders, while when costs are
convex more prizes could be optimal. However, the paper on multiple prize contests
most closely related to ours is the one by Barut and Kovenock (1998), who study
symmetric multiple prize all-pay auctions with complete information. They extend
the analysis of rst price all-pay auctions with complete information3 and show that,
when players are not constrained, only mixed strategy equilibria exist. Further,
expected expenditures are maximised by driving the value of the lowest prize to
zero, but are invariant across all congurations leaving the lowest value xed and
the sum of the values constant.
In this paper we consider a public good game with a linear production function
(as in Goeree et al., 2005) where agents have heterogenous endowments which are
private information. Such a game is a modied version of the game with complete
information which is typically employed in public good experiments. Each agent
chooses how much of her wealth to allocate to the public good; this money is multi-
plied by a parameter, which takes a value between one and the number of players, and
shared equally among all the agents. The unique Nash equilibrium is to contribute
nothing, although it is socially optimal to contribute all the wealth. We overcome
this extreme free-riding via a contest where several prizes may be awarded. We as-
2Applications have been made to promotions in labour markets (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), tech-
nological and research races (Wright, 1983; Dasgupta, 1986; Taylor, 1995; Fullerton and McAfee,
1999; Windham, 1999), credit markets (Breocker, 1990), and rent seeking (Tullock, 1980) among
others.
3The rst price all-pay auction with complete information has been utilised extensively in the
literature (Dasgupta, 1986; Hillman and Samet, 1987; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Ellingsen, 1991;
Baye et al., 1993). There exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium and a complete characterisation
of its equilibria appears in Baye et al. (1996).
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sume that the social planner has access to a small4 budget, which can be allocated
in form of prizes. The rst prize is awarded to the player who contributes the most,
the second prize to the player with the second highest contribution and so on until
all prizes are awarded. The social planner determines the prize structure in order to
maximise expected total welfare net of the value of the total prize sum.
Heterogeneity and incomplete information enable us to characterise a monotone
equilibrium, in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment. Such
an equilibrium is a purication of the mixed strategy equilibrium identied by Barut
and Kovenock (1998) in a symmetric setting with complete information and uncon-
strained agents. Our prediction seems more plausible than a completely symmetric
equilibrium, either in mixed or in pure strategies. We prove that it is optimal for the
social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise total expected con-
tribution is independent of the distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes.
We show that the contest is a budget balanced incentive mechanism: expected total
contribution is higher than the value of the total prize sum. There exists a critical
level of the budget under which the monotone equilibrium exists independently of
the prize structure. For any possible distribution of the endowments we identify
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the total prize sum to be below this critical
level. Finally we prove that private provision via a contest Pareto-dominates public
provision and is higher than total contribution in a lottery.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we introduce a linear pub-
lic good game with complete information, as it is usually employed in public good
experiments. In Section 2.3 we present the model and identify the Nash equilib-
rium. In Section 2.4 we solve the designers problem and discuss the existence of the
equilibrium. Section 2.5 compares private provision via a contest with both public
provision and private provision in a lottery. Section 2.6 concludes.
4We focus on cases where fund-raisers auction prizes of relatively low value. This seems to be
the main source of revenue for most charities. See for example Goeree et al. (2005), who provide
data showing that the vast majority of fund-raisers seek small donations from a large number of
donors.
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2.2 A Linear Public Good Game with Complete
Information
In this section we present the game which is typically used in public good experi-
ments. n subjects take part in the experiment. Each subject is endowed with the
same amount of money z and simultaneously chooses how much of her wealth to
allocate to the public good; this money is multiplied by a parameter  and shared
equally among all the subjects. Agent is payo¤ can be described by
Ui = z   gi + 
G
n
where gi is is contribution to the public good and G =
nX
i=1
gi is the total level
of public good. If  2 (1; n) an individuals opportunity cost of contributing to the
public good exceeds the marginal return of investing in the public good. Thus, the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game is to contribute nothing, while it is e¢ cient to
contribute all the wealth.
2.3 The Model
Let us consider n players. Each player i is assumed to have endowment zi, which
is private information. Endowments are drawn independently of each other from
the interval [0; 1] according to the distribution function F (z), which is common
knowledge, with mean E[z]. We assume that F (z) has a continuous and bounded
density F
0
(z) > 0. Players play a public good game in which each individual has
to choose how much to contribute to the public good. At the same time they take
part in a contest in which n prizes are awarded such that 1      m 1 > m =
   = n  0, 1 < m  n and
nX
j=1
j = . This assumption rules out the possibility
of awarding n equal prizes and will enable us to nd an equilibrium. We will call
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 = (1;    ; n) 2 Rn the vector of prizes. The player with the highest contribution
wins 1, the player with the second highest contribution wins 2, and so on until
all the prizes are allocated. For each player, a strategy g(z) will be the contribution
to the public good as a function of the players endowment and the action space for
player i will be the interval [0; zi]. If player i, who has endowment zi and contributes
gi, wins prize j her payo¤ is




where  2 (1; n). Given the value assumed by , notice that the equilibrium in
the absence of a contest is the same as in the game described in Section 2.2.
Each player i chooses her contribution in order to maximise expected utility
(given the other playerscontributions and given the values of the di¤erent prizes).
We will assume that  is exogenously determined. For a given value of , the social
planner determines the number of prizes having positive value and the distribution
of the total prize sum among the di¤erent prizes in order to maximise the expected
value of total welfare net of the value of  (given the playersequilibrium strategy
functions).
We will focus on the case in which the equilibrium strategy g(z) is less than z
for any type z on the interval [0; 1]. In order to nd the equilibrium of the game it









(F (z))n i(1  F (z))i 1 (2.1)
Given a vector of prizes , K(F (z)) is a linear combination of n order statistics
with weights equal to the prizes. If all agents adopt the same strictly increasing
strategy g(z), K(F (z)) represents the expected prize of the player with endowment
z. The following result will help us identify the equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 2.1 The function K(F (z)) is strictly monotonic increasing in z.
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Proof. Lets consider zi and zj such that 0  zi < zj  1. Given that F (zi) < F (zj),
and given the assumption that 1      m 1 > m =    = n  0, 1 < m  n,
K(F (zj)) assigns higher weights than K(F (zi)) to higher prizes and lower weights
than K(F (zi)) to lower prizes. Therefore K(F (zi)) < K(F (zj)).
Given Lemma (2.1), at interior solutions for all players we are able to charac-
terise a monotone equilibrium, in which the contribution is strictly increasing in
the endowment. Later on we will identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for its
existence independently of the prize structure.
Proposition 2.1 Given a vector  of prizes, at an interior solution for all players
the game has a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium given by
g(z) =
n
n  (K(F (z))  n)
Proof. The expected utility of a player from a choice g can be calculated as
E[U(z   g; ) j g; g i] =
z   g + G
n
+ (Pr[1 j g; g i]1 + Pr[2 j g; g i]2 +   + Pr[n j g; g i]n)
where Pr[j j g; g i] is the probability of a choice g being j-th highest conditional
on the other strategies g i. If all agents adopt the same strictly increasing strategy
g(z), then the probability that a candidate with endowment zi is higher ranked
than another randomly chosen candidate is Pr[g(zi) > g(z)] = Pr[zi > z] = F (zi).
Therefore









(F (z))n i(1  F (z))i 1
Now, given the common strategy g(z), we suppose that an individual with endow-
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ment z chooses g(ẑ) for some ẑ, then her expected utility will be
z   g(ẑ) + G i + g(ẑ)
n
+K(F (ẑ))
where G i is the sum of the contributions of all the other players. Di¤erentiating
with respect to ẑ we obtain
  n
n
g0(ẑ) +K 0(F (ẑ))F 0(ẑ)
In equilibrium the individual with endowment z should choose g(z) so that the above





A player with the lowest possible endowment z = 0 does not contribute to the public




n  (K(F (z))  n)
From Lemma (2.1) we know that the candidate equilibrium function g is strictly
monotonic increasing.
Assuming that all players rather than i play according to g, we nally need to
show that, for any type z of player i, the contribution g(z) maximises the expected
utility of that type. Let us consider an individual with endowment z. If she plays
g(z) = n
n (K(F (z))  n) her expected utility is given by
E[U(z; g(z)) j g i] = z  







If she deviates and plays n
n (K(F (ẑ)) n) for some ẑ 6= z her expected utility will
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be
E[U(z; g(ẑ)) j g i] =
z   n













n  n) +K(F (ẑ))
= z   






Therefore she is indi¤erent to play any other strategy n
n (K(F (ẑ))   n). If her
action space [0; z] is a subset of the set g i this rules out the possibility that she
might be better o¤ deviating from g(z). If z > g(1) it is easy to show that she would
be worse o¤ playing any strategy greater than g(1). In fact, playing g(1) would
already guarantee 1 and any higher contribution would result in a lower expected
utility.
Notice that the equilibrium strategy function dened in Proposition (2.1) can be
rearranged as g(z) = 1
1 
n
(K(F (z))   n). The latter is the sum of a convergent
series with reason 
n
and can be expressed as







The rst part of the above equation represents the expected prize, in equilibrium,
of a player with endowment z, net of the value of the last prize. This is because a






)m reects the return to investment in the public good. In standard
all-pay auctions an agent bids her expected prize in equilibrium. In our model, if an
agent contributes up to her expected prize (net of the last prize) she receives back

n
times the value of her bid because of the public good. This implies that she will
add to her contribution this remaining value, from which she will get back an equal
proportion, and so on.
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2.4 Designers Problem and Revenue Equivalence
In this section we consider the maximisation problem faced by the designer, assuming
that wealth constraints are non-binding for all players. We will then discuss the
conditions which guarantee the existence of the equilibrium independently of the
allocation of  across the prizes.
Recall that the social planner determines the number of prizes having positive
value and the distribution of the total prize sum among the di¤erent prizes in order to
maximise expected total welfare net of the value of  (given the playersequilibrium
strategy functions). In order to analyse the maximisation problem we let the vector
of prizes  be variable, maintaining the assumptions that 1      m 1 > m =
   = n  0, 1 < m  n and
nX
j=1
j = , and we study the family of functions
(F (z);  j
nX
j=1
j = ; 1      m 1 > m = (2.2)








(F (z))n i(1  F (z))i 1
Notice that, if  were xed expression (2.2) would reduce toK(F (z)), as presented
in equation (2.1). Letting the vector of prizes  be variable, at an interior solution
for all players, the equilibrium strategy is represented by the following5
g(z; ) =
n










(F (z))n i(1  F (z))i 1   n
n  n
5For simplicity of notation, unless di¤erently specied, from now on we will refer to (F (z);  j
nX
j=1
j = ; 1      m 1 > m =    = n  0; 1 < m  n) as (F (z); ).
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(z   g(z; ) + 
n
G+ (F (z); ))F 0(z)dz    (2.3)
Recall that in equilibrium (F (z); ) represents the expected prize of a player
with endowment z. This means that independently of the distribution of the total




(F (z); )F 0(z)dz =  (2.4)









Note that the above expression depends only on the total prize sum and on the











and we can state the following result.
Proposition 2.2 At an interior solution for all players the social planner optimally
sets the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise expected total contribution is G = n
n 
independently of the distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes.
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0(z)dz = nE[z] +
n(  1)
n   (  nn)
It is obvious that n = 0 maximises the above expression. Further, from equation
(2.5) we know that total expected contribution equals n
n  when n = 0.
Total expected contribution is higher than the total prize sum. While the stan-
dard result in all-pay auctions is the total dissipation of rent, in our model over-
dissipation occurs because of the marginal return of investing in the public good.
Furthermore, from expression (2.7) we can see that in equilibrium total expected
welfare net of the value of  equals nE[z] + n( 1)
n  , where nE[z] represents initial
welfare. This implies that the contest is a budget balanced incentive mechanism: the
social planner does not need to possess  in the rst place, but can simply detract
it from the total contribution.
Corollary 2.1 The contest is a budget balanced incentive mechanism. At an interior
solution for all players, provided that the social planner optimally sets the last prize
equal to zero, total expected welfare net of the value of  is higher than initial welfare
and equals nE[z] + n( 1)
n  .
So far we have assumed that wealth constraints are non-binding for all agents. In
order for the revenue equivalence to hold the solution must be interior for all players
for any possible distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes. Continuity to-
gether with the assumption that F (z) has a bounded density guarantee the existence
of the equilibrium, independently of the allocation of prizes, if  is small enough.
Proposition 2.3 There exists a critical level  such that the equilibrium strategy
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function is interior for all players independently of the distribution of the total prize
sum across the rst n  1 prizes if and only if   .
Proposition (2.8) in Appendix 2 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
 to be below such a critical value independently of the distribution of  among the
prizes, provided that the social planner optimally sets the last prize equal to zero.
2.5 Contest versus Public Provision and Lottery
We are going to compare the result obtained through a contest with both the welfare
generated by public provision and the total contribution resulting from the use of a
lottery.
When socially desirable public goods are not privately provided the obvious al-
ternative is to publicly provide them. Suppose that the social planner has access to
a budget equal to   . Instead of allocating this sum in form of prizes he provides
an amount of public good equal to . We want to analyse how the total expected
welfare generated by public provision compares with that resulting form the use of
a contest as an incentive scheme.
Proposition 2.4 Private provision of public good via a contest, in which the total
sum prize    is distributed among the n   1 players who contribute the most,
Pareto-dominates public provision. If the social planner uses    to publicly
provide the public good the expected total welfare net of the value of  is W P =
nE[z] + (  1).
Proof. If the social planner uses    to provide the public good the expected
total welfare net of the value of  is given by






)F 0(z)dz    = (2.8)
nE[z] + (  1)
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From Corollary (2.1) we know that, if the last prize is equal to zero, the expected
total welfare generated by a contest is equal to
W = nE[z] +
n(  1)
n   
which is strictly greater than expression (2.8).
We now consider the case where the social planner resorts to a lottery to en-
courage contribution to the public good. In order to be able to compare the lottery
mechanism with a contest we will restrict the analysis to interior solutions. To do
this let us assume n players whose endowments are drawn independently of each
other from the interval [z
¯
; z], with z
¯
strictly positive, according to the distribution
function F (z), which is common knowledge. Assume that the social planner decides
to award the sum  in a lottery with the following properties. If player i with en-
dowment zi contributes gi 2 [0; zi] she wins  with probability gigi+G i , where G i is
the sum of the contributions of all the other agents. Player is expected utility is
given by















Assuming that total contribution is di¤erent from zero6 and rearranging we obtain
player is best response function, given by the following expression




6Notice that in equilibrium the total contribution will not be zero. In fact, if any other player
di¤erent from i contributes zero, player i will contribute " arbitrarily close to zero and win the
prize.
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Based on equation (2.9) we can write an expression for the total contribution
when player i plays according to her best response function




Although endowments are private information, notice that z does not enter the
rst order condition. Each player will have the same best response function and the













Setting equations (2.9) and (2.10) equal we obtain an expression for G i when




Therefore, assuming that wealth constraints are non-binding, in equilibrium all




It is easy to see that   n(n )
n 1 z¯
guarantees that the solution will be interior
for all players. Contrary to the equilibrium we identied for the case of a contest,
in a lottery all players contribute the same amount (as in Morgan, 2000). Total




These results are summarised in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.5 Assume n players whose endowments are drawn independently of
each other from the interval [z
¯
; z], with z
¯
strictly positive, according to the distribution
function F (z), which is common knowledge. Assume that z is private information.
If   n(n )
n 1 z¯
the lottery has a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which all
players contribute gL = n 1
n(n ) and total contribution is G
L = n 1
n .
Note that in order to prove Proposition (2.7) in Appendix 2 we have not resorted
to the support of z. The same conditions guarantee the existence of the equilibrium
described in Proposition (2.1) also when endowments are drawn from the interval
[z
¯
; z], with z
¯
strictly positive, according to the distribution function F (z), which
is common knowledge, with a continuous and bounded density F
0
(z) > 0. In this
case, provided that the social planner optimally sets the last prize equal to zero, the






n  (F (z);  j
nX
j=1
j = ; 1 
    n; n = 0)F 0(z)dz =
n
n  
We can conclude that for any nite n, when  guarantees interior solutions for all
players in both mechanisms, the expected total contribution raised with a contest is
greater than that obtained through a lottery. The intuition behind this result is that
a lottery can be thought of as a stochastic contest (see Tullock, 1980): the higher
level of noise results in lower total revenue.
Proposition 2.6 Assume n players whose endowments are drawn independently
of each other from the interval [z
¯
; z], with z
¯
strictly positive, according to the dis-
tribution function F (z), which is common knowledge. Assume that z is private
information and that F (z) has a continuous and bounded density F
0
(z) > 0. If
  min[n(n )
n 1 z¯
; ], the expected total contribution in a contest, where  is allo-
cated among the n   1 players who contribute the most, is greater than the total
provision generated by a lottery.
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2.6 Conclusions
Exploring e¤ective ways to fund public goods is a policy question of great importance,
given the fundamental role they play in society. There exists an extensive literature
on fund-raising mechanisms based on taxes and penalties. However, solutions to the
free-riding problem which do not require coercive power have only recently started
to be studied. In the case of institutions which are unable to enforce sanctions, such
as charities, this di¤erence may be extremely important. To our knowledge, this is
the rst attempt to analyse multiple prize contests as incentive schemes to nance
public goods. Further, this recent literature has either focused on cases where agents
are unconstrained or have homogeneous endowments (e.g. Morgan and Sefton, 2000;
Goeree et al. 2005; Orzen, 2005) or predicts that players with di¤erent incomes would
contribute the same amount (Morgan, 2000). Contrary to these studies we identied
an equilibrium in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment.
We considered a linear public good game as it is often employed in laboratory
experiments. The main characteristics of the model are the possibility of awarding
multiple prizes on the one side, and heterogeneity of the endowments and incomplete
information on the other. We assumed that the social planner has access to a small
budget and uses it to implement a contest. The rst prize is awarded to the player
who contributes the most, the second prize to the player with the second highest
contribution and so on until all prizes are awarded. The social planners objective
function is represented by the expected total welfare net of the total prize sum.
We concentrated our analysis on interior solutions. We found that there exists
a critical level of budget under which wealth constraints are non-binding for all
agents. For any possible distribution of wealth we identied necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the budget to be below this critical level. We found that it is optimal
for the social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise total expected
contribution is invariant to all congurations leaving the lowest value xed. Further,
a contest is a budget balanced mechanism: the revenue generated is higher than
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the total prize sum. Provided interior solutions, we proved that a contest Pareto-
dominates public provision of the public good and performs better than a lottery.
Heterogeneity of the endowments and incomplete information about income levels
allowed us to characterise a monotone equilibrium, in which the higher the endow-
ment of a player the higher her contribution. On the contrary, in the case of a lottery,
a symmetric equilibrium arises (as in Morgan, 2000). This is an interesting di¤er-
ence which makes the equilibrium of a contest look more realistic than the latter.
Indeed it does seem generally more plausible that richer people contribute more than
individuals with lower incomes.
An interesting extension to the present work would be to test experimentally
the main results of the model. An important question would be to check whether
a contest actually generates a higher contribution than a lottery, and whether the
revenue of a contest is independent of the prize structure. Further, it would be
interesting to test whether a monotone equilibrium would arise, both in a contest
and in a lottery.
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Appendix 2
We want to nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the value of  such that g(z)
is interior for any z on the interval [0; 1] for any possible allocation of  among the
rst n   1 prizes. In fact, assuming interior solutions, Proposition (2.2) assures us
that the social planner will set n = 0.
If we let the vector of prizes  be variable, provided that the last prize is equal
to zero and that the sum of the rst n   1 prizes is equal to , g(z) is represented
by the following7
n
n  (F (z);  j
nX
j=1










(F (z))n i(1  F (z))i 1
Let us dene the following object.
Denition 2.1 Dene the envelope function
V (z) = max

f(F (z); ) j
nX
j=1
j = ; 1      n; n = 0g
for any z on the interval [0; 1].
If we are able to provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for V (z) to be weakly
less than z for any z on the interval [0; 1], it will be easy to extend the result to g(z).
In order to do this we will dene some useful concepts that will help us in the course
of our analysis.
Denition 2.2 For any i such that 1  i  n  1:
7Hereafter, unlike the rest of the paper, when writing (F (z); ) we will refer to (F (z);  j
nX
j=1
j = ; 1      n; n = 0).
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1) dene the set Qi  Rnsuch that for every  2 Qi it holds that 1      i >




2) call i the vector  2 Qi such that 1 =    = i = i .
Denition 2.3 For any i such that 2  i  n  1 dene the set ~Qi  Qi such that
for every  2 ~Qi it holds that 1 > i.
Obviously 1 2 Q1, characterised by 11 = ; 1l = 0 for 2  l  n, is the only
element of the set Q1 and (F (z); 1) = (F (z))n 1.
The next Proposition presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions for V (z) to be
weakly less than z on the interval [0; 1].
Proposition 2.7 (F (z); i)  z on the interval [0; 1] for 1  i  n  1 are neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for V (z)  z.
Proof. The necessity of these conditions is obvious. In order to prove su¢ ciency we
will have to present some technical results.
Lemma 2.2 Given a vector R 2 Rn such that
nX
j=1
Rj =  and 
R
1      Rn ;
Rn = 0, consider a redistribution of the type  Ri = Ri+1, with 1  i  n   1
and Ri > 0, and call the resulting vector 
S. Then, (F (z); S) > (F (z); R)
for any z such that F (z) < n i
n
and (F (z); S) < (F (z); R) for any z such that
F (z) > n i
n
.







(F (z))n i(1   F (z))i 1. To see how a redis-






















































Lemma 2.3 Assume 1  i  n  2. Consider a vector B 2 ~Qi+1. If 2  i  n  2
then (F (z); i+1) > (F (z); B) for any z such that F (z)  n i
n
. If i = 1 then




;  j  2 Q2) =
(n 1
n
; 1) = (n 1
n
)n 1.
Proof. Let us rst consider the case in which 2  i  n  2. The vector i+1 can be
obtained from vector B applying the following algorithm in i steps.
Algorithm 2.1 Step 1. From vector B construct vector B1 such that B11 =

i+1








j ; 3  j  i + 1. Given that B2  B3 it
will now be the case that B12 > 
B1
3      B1i+1. Therefore i+1 + i
B1
2 > . The
last inequality can be rewritten as B12 >

i+1
, therefore we can move to the next step
and repeat the process.












l for 1  l  j 1 and j+1  l 
i+1. Given that Bj 1j+1  
Bj 1




j+2      
Bj
i+1.
Therefore it is the case that j 
i+1
+(i+1 j) Bjj+1 > . Rearranging the last inequality
we obtain Bjj+1 >

i+1
. This means that we can move to the next step and repeat the
process.










l for 1  l  i   1. Notice that Bi 1l = i+1 for
1  l  i  1. Therefore Bi = i+1.
Notice that from Lemma 2.2 we know that (F (z); Bj) > (F (z); Bj 1) for any
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z such that F (z) < n j
n
for 1  j  i. Therefore (F (z); i+1) > (F (z); B) for
any z such that F (z)  n i
n
, as we wished to show.







Applying the same algorithm as above from B we will obtain 22 after the rst step.
Applying Lemma 2.2 we know that (F (z); 2) > (F (z); B) for any z such that
F (z) < n 1
n
. Further, from Lemma 2.2 we also know that (F (z);  j  2 Q2) >
(F (z); 1) for any z such that F (z) < n 1
n
and (F (z);  j  2 Q2) < (F (z); 1)
for any z such that F (z) > n 1
n
. Therefore, by continuity, we can conclude that
(n 1
n
;  j  2 Q2) = (n 1
n
; 1) = (n 1
n
)n 1.
Lemma 2.4 Assume 2  i  n  2. (F (z); i+1) > (F (z);  j  2 Qj) for any z
such that F (z)  n i
n
and for 1  j  i.
Proof. The structure of this proof is in three parts.
First of all, from Lemma 2.3 we know that (F (z); j) > (F (z);  j  2 ~Qj)
for any z such that F (z)  n j+1
n
and, given that 2  j  i, for any z such that
F (z)  n i
n
.
For the second part of the proof, let us rs assume j = 1. Consider a vector
B 2 ~Qi+1. We want to show that (F (z); B) > (F (z); 1) for any z such that
F (z)  n i
n
.
If 2  j  i, consider a vector B 2 ~Qi+1 such that Bl = 
j
l for 1  l  j   1.
Notice that, obviously, Bj < 
j
l . We want to show that (F (z); 
B) > (F (z); j)
for any z such that F (z)  n i
n
if 2  j  i  1 and for any z such that F (z) < n i
n
if j = i.
Vector B can be obtained from j through the following algorithm in i + 1   j
steps.





2 =  B1 . If 2  j  i, from vector j construct vector A1 2 ~Qj+1





for 1  l  j   1; A1j = Bj and A1j+1 = 
j




Step k, with 2  k  i  j. From vector Ak 1 construct vector Ak 2 ~Qj+k such
that Akl = 
Ak 1
l for 1  l  j = k 2; Akj+k 1 = Bj+k 1 and Akj+k = Ak 1j+k 1 Bj+k 1.
Step i + 1   j. From vector Ai j construct vector Ai+1 j 2 ~Qi+1 such that
Ai+1 jl = 
Ai j








i   Bi . Notice
that Ai+1 ji+1 = 
B
i+1 and 
Ai+1 j = B by construction.
From Lemma 2.2 we know that (F (z); Ak) > (F (z); Ak 1) for any z such
that F (z) < n+1 k
n
. Therefore if 1  j  i   1 then (F (z); B) > (F (z); j) for
any z such that F (z)  n i
n
. If j = i then (F (z); B) > (F (z); j) for any z such




; B) = (n i
n
; j).
Finally, from Lemma 2.3 we know that (F (z); i+1) > (F (z); B) for any z
such that F (z)  n i
n
. Therefore (F (z); i+1) > (F (z);  j  2 ~Qj) for any z such
that F (z)  n 1
n
.
Lemma 2.5 Assume 2  i  n   2. Consider a vector B 2 ~Qi+1 such that B1 >
Bj , with 2  j  i. Assume a vector C 2 ~Qi+1 such that Cl = Bl for j+1  l  i+






. If 3  j  n  2 then (F (z); C) > (F (z); B)
for any z such that F (z)  n j+1
n
. If j = 2 then (F (z); C) > (F (z); B) for any




; C) > (n 1
n
; B).






j . Vector 
C can be obtained from vector
B applying the following algorithm in j   1 steps.







1   C1 ; B1l = Bl for 3  l  i + 1. Given that B2  B3 it
will now be the case that B12 > 
B1





















. Therefore we can move to the next step and repeat the process.
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k   Ck ; Bkl = Bk 1l for 1  l  k   1 and






for 1  l  k and
Bkl = 
B
l for k+2  l  i+1. Given that Bk 1k+1  Bk 1k+2 it will now be the case that
Bkk+1 > 
Bk
k+1      Bki+1. Therefore kj ( 
i+1X
l=j+1










. Therefore we can move
to the next step and repeat the process.









l for 1  l  j   2 and j +1  l  i+1. Notice
that Bj 1 = C by construction.
From Lemma 2.2 we know that (F (z); Bk) > (F (z); Bk 1) for any z such
that F (z) < n k
n
for 1  k  j   1. This means that if 3  i  n   3 then, by
construction, we will have (F (z); C) > (F (z); B) for any z such that F (z) 
n j+1
n
. If i = 2 then j will necessarily be equal to 3 and, by construction, we will
have (F (z); C) > (F (z); B) for any z such that F (z) < n 1
n
. Further it will be
the case that (n 1
n
; C) > (n 1
n
; B).
Lemma 2.6 Consider a vector C 2 ~Qi+1 such that Ci+1 = x; Cj =  xi with 0 <
x < 
i+1
for 1  j  i and 2  i  n   2. If (F (z); C) > (F (z); i+1) then
(F (z); i) > (F (z); C).
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Proof. The inequality (F (z); C) > (F (z); i+1) can be rewritten as
  x
i










(F (z))n i 1(1  F (z))i  

i+ 1
((F (z))n 1 +   + (F (z))n i 1(1  F (z))i) > 0














  x)(F (z))n i 1(1  F (z))i





(F (z))n i(1 F (z))i 1) and call B the
expression (F (z))n i 1(1  F (z))i. Inequality (2.12) is satised for A
B
> i.





A  xB > 0 (2.13)
Inequality (2.13) is satised for A
B
> i.
From Lemma (2.4) we know that (F (z); i+1) > (F (z);  j  2 Qj) for any
z such that F (z)  n i
n
and for 2  i  n   2 and 1  j  i. In particular, this
means that V (z) will be equal to (F (z); n 1) for any z such that 0  F (z)  2
n
.
For those z such that 2
n
 F (z)  3
n
we will have to check the family of functions
(F (z);  j  2 Qn 1) and (F (z); n 2). In general, assuming 0  i  n   3, in
order to nd V (z) for those z such that n i 1
n
 F (z)  n i
n
we will have to check
the families of functions (F (z);  j  2 Qj) for i + 2  j  n  1 and the function
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(F (z); i+1).
Consider now a vector C 2 Qi+1 such that C1 =    = Ci > Ci+1, for 2  i 
n  2. From Lemma (2.5) we know that, for those z such that n i
n
< F (z)  n i+1
n
,
the function (F (z); C) is greater than any other function of the family (F (z);  j
 2 Qi+1) excluding (F (z); i+1).
From Lemma (2.6) though, we know that if (F (z); C) > (F (z); i+1) then it
is the case that (F (z); i) > (F (z); C).
Therefore, in order to nd the envelope function V (z) for those z such that
2
n
 F (z)  3
n
, it will be su¢ cient to check the two functions (F (z); n 1) and
(F (z); n 2). In general, assuming 0  i  n   3, in order to nd V (z) for those
z such that n i 1
n
 F (z)  n i
n
we will have to check the functions (F (z); j) for
i+ 1  j  n  1.
From this follows that (F (z); i)  z for 1  i  n  1 are su¢ cient conditions
for V (z)  z on the interval [0; 1].
Finally, given Proposition (2.7), by continuity we can establish the following
result.
Proposition 2.8 Provided that the last prize is equal to zero, g(z) is interior for
any z on the interval [0; 1] independently of the distribution of  among the rst





ij = )  z on the interval [0; 1] for
1  i  n  1.
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Chapter 3
A Prize To Give for: An
Experiment on Public Good
Funding Mechanisms
3.1 Introduction
Finding e¤ective fund-raising mechanisms for the private provision of public goods is
an important policy question. Voluntary contributions to public goods are typically
well below socially optimal levels, given the incentive to free ride associated with
positive externalities.1 While fund-raising mechanisms based on tax rewards and
penalties can be designed to overcome the incentive to free ride, they are not available
to fund-raisers in the private sector who cannot enforce sanctions. A number of
recent studies have examined, both theoretically and empirically, the performance
of incentive-based funding mechanisms for the private provision of public goods,
focusing in particular on lotteries (or ra­ es) and di¤erent types of auctions (e.g.
1Voluntary contributions to public goods are generally found to be greater than theoretical
predictions, both in naturally occurring situations and in laboratory experiments, but nevertheless
sub-optimal. See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of the experimental literature on the provision of
public goods. See also e.g. Keser (1996), Laurie and Holt (1998), and Saijo (2003) for alternative
explanations of over-contribution in the voluntary provision of public goods.
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Morgan, 2000; Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Goeree et al., 2005; Orzen, 2005; Schram
and Onderstal, 2006).2
In this paper we investigate with a laboratory experiment the performance of
prize-based mechanisms for the private provision of public goods, under the as-
sumptions of income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels.
We focus on a voluntary contribution mechanism, used as a benchmark, and two
incentive-based mechanisms where a single prize is awarded: a lottery and an all-pay
auction.
The experimental literature on incentive-based fund-raising mechanisms has fo-
cused on the case of income homogeneity (e.g. Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Orzen,
2005; Schram and Onderstal, 2006). However, actual contribution to public goods
is generally characterised by heterogeneous incomes which are private information.
Although several experimental studies have investigated public good provision when
incomes are heterogeneous, this literature has only explored the voluntary contri-
bution mechanism.3 The performance of incentive-based fund-raising mechanisms
when subjects have di¤erent incomes remains empirically unexplored.
Morgan (2000) provides a theoretical analysis of lotteries as a way to nance
public goods. Players buy tickets of a lottery in which one prize is awarded. One
ticket is randomly drawn and the holder wins the prize. Public good provision con-
sists of the revenue of the lottery net of the prize. The author considers agents with
heterogeneous preferences and endowments who have quasi-linear utility functions.
Public good provision is shown to be strictly higher than with voluntary contribu-
tions. The solution identied by Morgan (2000) predicts that agents with di¤erent
incomes contribute the same amount in equilibrium. Such an equilibrium does not
seem realistic, while it appears more plausible that the contribution would be in-
2See also e.g. Isaac and Walker (1988), Bagnoli, and Lipman (1989), Bagnoli and McKee (1991)
for earlier studies on mechanisms for improving economic e¢ ciency in the voluntary provision of
public goods.
3Research has examined the e¤ects of income heterogeneity on either overall public good provi-
sion (Anderson et al., 2004; Chan et al., 1996; Chan et al., 1999; Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993) or
contributions of individual income types (Buckley and Croson, 2005).
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creasing in the endowment. Morgan and Sefton (2000) investigate experimentally
the performance of a linear version of Morgans model, nding that, as predicted,
public good provision via a lottery is higher than through voluntary contributions.
However they only consider homogeneous endowments, without testing the validity
of a completely symmetric equilibrium.
Orzen (2005) compares in a laboratory experiment the performance of a lottery
and di¤erent all-pay auctions as fund-raising mechanisms, under the assumptions of
homogeneous preferences and endowments. Public good provision generated by the
incentive-based mechanisms is higher than voluntary contributions. Interestingly,
although theory predicts that the rst price all-pay auction raises a higher revenue
than the lottery, no signicant di¤erence is found between the two treatments. Fi-
nally, Schram and Onderstal (2006) present an experimental study that compares
a winner-pay auction, an all-pay auction and a lottery in the case of heterogeneous
preferences, but homogeneous endowments. They nd that the all-pay auction per-
forms better than the lottery mechanism, as predicted by the theory. In sum, all of
these studies focus on the case of homogeneous endowments.
Our analysis is based on a theoretical framework where prizes are used as a means
to nance public goods when agents have heterogeneous endowments which are pri-
vate information. In this setting, an all-pay auction generates a higher expected total
contribution than a lottery with an equal prize. In the all-pay auction, it is possible
to identify a monotone equilibrium such that contributions are strictly increasing in
the endowment. The equilibrium of the lottery is instead completely symmetric, as
in Morgan (2000), with all agents contributing the same amount independently of
their endowment.
In our experiment, we test the following theoretical predictions. First, incentive-
based mechanisms should outperform the voluntary contribution mechanism in terms
of net contributions (after taking into account the cost of prizes). Second, the total
revenue of the all-pay auction should be higher than that of a lottery with an equal
prize. Third, absolute contributions should not depend on income in the lottery,
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whereas they should rise with income in the all-pay auction. As a consequence,
individual contributions should be higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction
at the lower end of the income distribution, while the opposite should hold at the
upper end of the income distribution.
The main ndings of the analysis can be summarised as follows. In all mech-
anisms average contributions are generally higher than theoretical predictions and
tend to converge towards the predicted values over successive rounds. The volun-
tary contribution mechanism replicates the behavioural patterns observed in similar
experiments under income homogeneity or heterogenous incomes and complete in-
formation. The introduction of a prize as an incentive has signicant e¤ects on
contributions: the lottery and, to a lesser extent, the all-pay auction perform better
than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision after accounting for
the cost of prizes. Comparing the prize-based mechanisms, contributions are signif-
icantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction, contrary to the theoretical
predictions. Focusing on the behaviour of individual income types, absolute contri-
butions rise with income in all treatments, although more steeply in the prize-based
mechanisms, so that relative contributions are generally similar across income types.
In terms of relative performance, the lottery does better than the other mechanisms
for all income types. At the individual level, subjects choose zero contributions in
the all-pay auction about three times as often as in the lottery.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical back-
ground of the analysis. Section 3.3 describes the experimental design and the theo-
retical predictions to be tested. Section 3.4 presents the results. Section 3.5 concludes
with a discussion of the main ndings and implications of the analysis.
3.2 Theoretical Background
In this section we present the main theoretical predictions for the performance of
single-prize all-pay auctions and lotteries, as fund-raising mechanisms for the private
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provision of public goods, under the assumptions of income heterogeneity and in-
complete information about income levels. The analysis is based on the framework
presented in Faravelli (2007).
Consider a public good game with n risk neutral players. Each player i is assumed
to have income zi, which is private information. Incomes are drawn independently
of each other from the distribution function F (z) on the interval [z
¯
; z]. F (z) is
common knowledge and has a continuous and bounded density F 0(z). Each player
has to decide how much of his endowment to contribute to the public good, knowing
that total contributions to the public good are multiplied by a parameter  2 (1; n)
and shared equally among all the agents. The cost of contributing to the public
good exceeds the marginal return of investing in it. Therefore, the unique Nash
equilibrium is to contribute nothing, although it is socially optimal to contribute all
the endowment.
Suppose that the fund-raiser has access to an amount . The fund-raiser moves
rst. He can either use  to provide the public good or organise either a lottery or an
all-pay auction in which the winner is awarded a prize equal to . Then the agents
choose their contributions in order to maximise their utility (expected utility in the
case of an all-pay auction), given the other playerscontributions and the value of
. If the fund-raiser spends all his budget  to provide the public good then the
payo¤ of of player i with endowment zi who contributes gi is given by
zi   gi +

n
( + gi +G i)
where G i is the sum of the contributions of all the other players. If the fund-raisers
uses  as a prize, player is payo¤ will be




where g i represents the vector of the individual contributions of all the other players.
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E[; gi; g i] is the expected prize of player i given all the other playerscontributions.
In the lottery, player i wins the prize with probability gi
gi+G i
, which is the number
of tickets he bought divided by the total number of tickets. In the all-pay auction he
wins if and only if his contribution is higher than all the other agentscontributions.
The main results for the di¤erent contribution mechanisms can be summarised
as follows.4 In the voluntary contribution mechanism the Nash equilibrium is to
contribute nothing. At interior solutions,5 the lottery has a symmetric pure strategy








Total contribution is higher than the cost of the prize. If public good provision is
socially desirable the lottery provides positive net revenues. The all-pay auction, at






Note that contributions in equilibrium are strictly increasing in the endowment.
F (z)n 1 represents the expected prize of a player with endowment z, when all
players play according to the same strictly increasing strategy. Total expected con-




The above expression is strictly greater than both the cost of the prize and the total
contribution under the lottery. A lottery can be thought of as a stochastic all-pay
4See Faravelli (2007) for the proofs of the following results.
5We focus on the case in which constraints are non-binding for all agents.
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auction, where the higher noise results in lower revenue (see Tullock, 1980).
Note that the equilibrium strategy function described by expression (3.2) can be
rearranged as gAPA(z) = 1
1 
n
F (z)n 1. This is the sum of a convergent series with
reason 
n
and can be written as







The standard result in all-pay auctions is the total dissipation of the rent. In this case
each individual bids more than the expected prize because of the marginal return of




Our experimental design follows Morgan and Sefton (2005) and, more closely, Orzen
(2005), while introducing income heterogeneity and incomplete information about
the income of other subjects. We considered three di¤erent treatments: a voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM), a lottery (LOT) and an all-pay auction (APA). We
ran three sessions for each treatment, with sixteen subjects participating in each
session, for a total of 144 subjects. Each session consisted of 20 rounds.
3.3.1 The Baseline Game
In each round, every subject had to allocate entirely a given endowment between
two accounts. The language used in the instructions did not refer to contributions or
public goods, but asked subjects to allocate tokens to either an individual account
or a group account. A subject received 2 points for each token he allocated to the
individual account, while he received 1 point for each token allocated by him or by
any other member of his group to the group account.
At the beginning of the session the sixteen subjects were randomly and anony-
mously assigned an endowment of either 120, 160, 200, or 240 tokens. Concentrating
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on a small number of possible endowments allowed us to analyse the e¤ects of income
heterogeneity in a controlled and simple setting, while providing several observations
on the same income type. The subjects were informed that in each round they would
receive the same endowment as determined at the beginning of the session.
Incomplete information about incomes was introduced by using a matching proce-
dure similar to the strangers condition used in Andreoni (1988b). At the beginning
of each round, subjects were randomly and anonymously rematched in groups of
four people. Therefore, in each round subjects did not know the identity and the
endowment of the other three members of their group. They only knew that the
endowment of each of the other group members could be either 120, 160, 200, or 240
tokens with equal probabilities.
Group matching for each of the twenty rounds was determined randomly before
the beginning of the experiment in the following way. Four pools of four subjects
were formed, each containing the four di¤erent income types (120, 160, 200, 240).
Each of the four groups was formed by randomly drawing one subject from each pool.
As a consequence, within every group each member could have an endowment of 120,
160, 200, or 240 tokens with equal probability.6 Having formed the four groups for
each round in this way, the same sequence of group matchings for the twenty rounds
was used in each session of all three treatments.
3.3.2 Treatments
The three treatments di¤ered in the way prizes (extra points) could be earned by
the subjects. In VCM, 120 tokens were exogenously allocated by the experimenter
to the group account in each round, independently of the subjects choices, thus
implying that each member of the group received 120 points as a bonus. In LOT,
a subject received a lottery ticket for each token he allocated to the group account.
6Note that in every round there were four subjects for each of the four possible endowments, so
that the average endowment was 180 tokens.
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At the end of each round the computer randomly selected one ticket among all those
purchased by the members of the group, and the owner of the selected ticket won
the prize of 240 points. In case no tokens were allocated to the group account, the
winner of the prize was selected randomly among the four members of the group.
In APA, in each round the member of the group who allocated the highest amount
to the group account won the prize of 240 points. In case of ties between two or
more group members, the winner was determined randomly by the computer. Note
that the four mechanisms imply the same nancial commitment for the fund-raiser:
allocating 120 tokens to the group account in VCM is equivalent to paying a prize
of 240 points in APA or in LOT.
3.3.3 Procedures
In each session, the subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal at their
arrival. To ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed and read aloud
(see Appendix 3A for the instructions). Moreover, to ensure understanding of the
experimental design, sample questions were distributed and the answers privately
checked and, if necessary, individually explained to the subjects.
At the end of each round, the subjects were informed about their payo¤s from
the group account, the individual account and the prize (or bonus in VCM). At
the end of the last round, subjects were informed about their total payo¤ for the
twenty rounds expressed in points and euros. They were then asked to answer a
short questionnaire on the understanding of the experiment and socio-demographic
information, and were then paid in private using an exchange rate of 1000 points per
euro. Subjects earned 12.25 euros on average for sessions lasting about 50 minutes,
including the time for instructions. Participants were mainly undergraduate students
of Economics and were recruited through an online system. The experiment took
place in May 2006 at the Experimental Lab of the University of Milan Bicocca. The
experiment was computerized using the zTree software (Fischbacher, 1999).
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3.3.4 Predictions
In this experimental design, within each group every subject can have one of four
possible endowments with equal probability. Compared with the model described in
Section 3.2, where each players endowment is drawn from a continuous distribution
function, it is easy to see that the equilibrium in VCM will still be to contribute
nothing. Similarly, LOT is characterised by the same equilibrium as described by
equation (3.1), and the same total contribution. This is because the best response
function of a player in the lottery game is independent of income, as in Morgan
(2000). The equilibrium is instead slightly modied in APA, although qualitatively
unchanged, given that the pure strategy equilibrium, as described by equation (3.2),
depends on the continuity of endowment distribution.
In Appendix 3B we consider an all-pay auction in a linear public good game
under the assumption of complete information. We solve the game for N players,
who can have any possible endowment, and for any positive level of prize. We show
that when the prize is not too high, only mixed strategy equilibria exist. The
equilibrium for a subject under incomplete information about the incomes of other
players consists of a randomisation over the mixed strategies he would play in all the
possible group matchings he faces, according to their corresponding probabilities.7
The total expected contribution in APA for the mixed strategy equilibrium under
a discrete income distribution is lower than that for the pure strategy equilibrium
under a continuous income distribution. This loss of revenue results from the dis-
continuity in the possible endowments: a subject with an endowment higher than
the lowest one will face opponents with a strictly lower endowment with positive
probability. In this case he will not have any incentive to bid more than the highest
of his opponentsendowments. Nevertheless, despite the lower expected revenue, all
the theoretical predictions described in Section 3.2 under a continuous distribution
7For instance, a subject endowed with 120 tokens could be grouped with three other subjects
with his same endowment, or with one subject with 160 and two others with 200 tokens, and so on.
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of endowments are qualitatively unchanged.
Table 3.1 presents the predicted contributions for the experimental design, both
in absolute and relative terms, for each income type and on average. Average contri-
butions for both prize-based mechanisms are higher than the predicted contribution
in VCM, which is zero. They are also higher than the average provision in VCM,
where an amount equivalent to the cost of the prize is used to directly nance the
public good, resulting in an average provision of 30 tokens per subject. The average
absolute contribution in APA (51 tokens) is higher than in LOT (45 tokens). Note
also that in LOT the predicted absolute contributions are independent of income lev-
els (25% in relative terms on average). Predicted contributions are instead steeply
increasing in the endowment in APA, both in absolute and relative terms.
Table 3.1: Theoretical predictions: absolute and relative contributions
Incomes Average
Treatments 120 160 200 240 180
Absolute contributions
VCM 0 0 0 0 0
LOT 45 45 45 45 45
APA 5 28 68 102 51
Relative contributions
VCM 0 0 0 0 0
LOT 38 28 23 19 25
APA 4 18 34 43 28
Note: contributions are rounded to the nearest integer. Relative contributions are expressed as a
percentage of the endowment.
Summing up, the main hypotheses to be tested are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (Absolute E¢ ciency): Both LOT and APA outperform
VCM not only in terms of gross contributions, but also after taking into
account the cost of the prize.
Hypothesis 2 (Relative E¢ ciency): The total contribution to the
public good is higher in APA than in LOT.
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Hypothesis 3 (Individual income types): Individual contributions
do not depend on income in LOT, while they increase with income in
APA. Contributions are therefore higher in LOT than in APA for low-
income types, while the opposite holds for high-income types.
3.4 Results
This section presents the experimental results. We start with a descriptive analysis
of the main features of the data for the three treatments. Next, we examine the
replicability of sessions within each treatment, the e¤ects of repetition over rounds,
and the dependence of individual observations within sessions. We then present
formal tests of the theoretical predictions, considering rst average contributions
over all subjects and then contributions by individual income types.
3.4.1 Overview
Figures 3.1-3.3 present an overview of average relative contributions (as a percentage
of the endowment) over rounds for each session of the three treatments. Table 3.2
reports relative contributions obtained by averaging over all subjects within each
session for all 20 rounds and for the following sub-sets of rounds: 1st, rst 10, last
10, and 20th.
The results for VCM sessions are similar to those generally obtained in public
good experiments with homogeneous incomes. Average contributions to the group
account are substantially higher than the equilibrium prediction of zero throughout
the twenty rounds, but display a clear downward trend over successive rounds (Figure
3.1). Averaging over all sessions and subjects, individual contributions are 21.6% over
the 20 rounds, falling from 35.1% in the rst round to 8.2% in the last round, and
from 26.1% in rounds 1-10 to 17.1% in rounds 11-20. The same pattern of positive
but declining contributions is observed in each of the three VCM sessions, and a
81
Table 3.2: Average individual contributions: by session and rounds
Rounds
Session 1-20 1 1-10 11-20 20
VCM 1 18.6 25.7 20.6 16.6 7.7
VCM 2 26.3 32.4 28.9 23.7 11.2
VCM 3 19.9 47.1 28.9 10.9 5.7
Average 21.6 35.1 26.1 17.1 8.2
LOT 1 42.1 38.5 45.3 38.9 39.9
LOT 2 46.2 48.5 50.0 42.3 39.3
LOT 3 52.7 45.7 52.8 52.5 41.8
Average 47.0 44.2 49.4 44.6 40.3
APA 1 41.8 51.8 46.0 37.7 52.4
APA 2 40.7 46.8 45.3 36.1 29.2
APA 3 36.2 45.3 38.5 33.9 30.3
Average 39.6 48.0 43.2 35.9 37.3
Note: contributions to the public good are expressed as a percentage of the endowment.
clear tendency to converge to a common level is observed in the nal rounds.
Average contributions for LOT sessions are also systematically higher than the
predicted contribution of 25%, and remain virtually constant over time, except for a
slight decline in the nal rounds (Figure 3.2). Average contributions over all sessions,
subjects and rounds are 47%, falling from 44.2% to 40.3% over the 20 rounds, and
from 49.4% to 44.6% between the rst and the second half of the session. The
declining pattern is not observed in all sessions and, although the three sessions
converge to a common level in the nal round, a relatively high variability across
sessions is observed in rounds 11-20.
In APA sessions, average contributions are larger than the predicted contribution
of 28%, and display a slight decline over rounds (Figure 3.3). All sessions start
with relatively high contributions, but tend to converge to the theoretical prediction
within the rst ten rounds. The average contribution is 39.6% over the twenty
rounds, falling from 43.2% in rounds 1-10 to 35.9% in rounds 11-20. Each of the
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Figure 3-1: Average contributions over time: VCM
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proles are very similar.
3.4.2 Replicability, Repetition, Sectional Dependence
The descriptive analysis of session-level data indicates that contributions for individ-
ual sessions within each treatment are qualitatively similar in terms of both average
levels and dynamics over rounds. We provide formal tests for the hypothesis of
replicability of session results within treatments. Table 3.3 presents Kruskal-Wallis
test statistics for the null hypothesis that median contributions are equal across the
three sessions within each treatment, focusing on the same sub-sets of rounds as in
Table 3.2. Focusing on the whole session (rounds 1-20) or the last round, the results
indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all treatments. We therefore
conclude that the three sessions can be pooled and the analysis is carried out on
observations for 48 individuals for each of the three treatments.
The analysis of session-level data also indicates that there are substantial changes
in contributions over successive rounds (repetition e¤ects). Contributions tend to fall
over rounds, generally converging towards theoretical predictions, in all treatments
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Table 3.3: Tests for replicability of sessions
Rounds
Treatment 1-20 1 1 - 10 11-20 20
VCM 4.93 5.83 4.21 6.43 0.75
(0.08) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.69)
LOT 2.16 1.08 0.89 3.68 0.26
(0.34) (0.58) (0.64) (0.16) (0.88)
APA 1.90 0.50 1.67 0.99 2.83
(0.39) (0.78) (0.43) (0.61) (0.24)
Note: the table reports Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for the null hypothesis that median contribu-
tions are equal across the three sessions within each treatment. P-values (in brackets) are based on
the 2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
except for LOT, where the tendency to converge is less marked. This could suggest
that excessive contributions may be due to the fact that subjects are learning how
to behave rationally. We provide formal tests for the e¤ects of repetition on contri-
butions. Table 3.4 presents results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the hypothesis
that median contributions are the same across selected pairs of rounds within each
treatment.
Table 3.4: Tests for repetition e¤ects
Rounds
Treatment 1 vs 10 10 vs 20 1 vs 15 5 vs 20 1 vs 20
VCM 3.04 2.96 3.26 4.11 5.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LOT -1.42 1.65 -0.04 1.23 0.99
(0.16) (0.10) (0.97) (0.22) (0.32)
APA 2.04 0.16 1.95 -0.31 1.76
(0.04) (0.87) (0.05) (0.76) (0.08)
Note: the table reports normalized Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics for the hypothesis that
median contributions are the same in the two rounds indicated in the column headings. P-values
(in brackets) refer to two-sided tests based on the standard normal distribution.
Irrespective of the time horizon considered, decreases in contributions are signif-
icant in VCM. LOT does not display any signicant round e¤ect, whereas in APA
the di¤erences are signicant between rounds 1 and 10 (p-value 0.04) and marginally
signicant between rounds 1 and 20 (p-value 0.08). We conclude that repetition
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a¤ects di¤erent mechanisms in di¤erent ways, so that comparisons between treat-
ments, and between actual and predicted contributions within treatments, cannot
focus on a single round but should consider alternative sub-sets of rounds in order
to take into account the di¤erent role played by repetition in each treatment.
In order to go beyond descriptive analysis and provide formal tests of the theo-
retical predictions we need to dene the appropriate unit of analysis (subject, group,
session). It is important to note that, because of repetition, subject-level obser-
vations within each session and round might be dependent, given that (in rounds
beyond the rst) subjects have interacted in previous rounds. In addition, because
of the random rematching mechanism (at the beginning of each round subjects are
randomly and anonymously rematched in groups of four people), independence could
also be violated for group-level observations. If the dependence of subject-level ob-
servations due to interactions in earlier rounds was relevant, inference would have to
be based on session-level observations (see e.g. Orzen, 2005).
However, the characteristics of the experimental design are such that the de-
pendence across individual observations can be considered negligible. First, at the
end of each round subjects only learn about the total contribution of other group
members, so that it is di¢ cult for them to infer individual absolute contributions.
Second, since subjects do not know the endowments of other group members, it is
even more di¢ cult for them to infer other subjectsrelative contributions (e.g. an
absolute contribution of 120 could be a relative contribution of 50% as well as 100%,
depending on the endowment of the other subject). Third, the number of players
within each session (sixteen) is su¢ ciently large, so that subjects know that there is
a relatively small probability of interacting with the same subjects as in the previous
round. This further reduces the motivation to reciprocate in successive rounds, thus
weakening the possible dependence across individual observations.
We also investigated the issue at the empirical level, by considering Spearman
rank correlation tests for the null hypothesis of independence between the contri-
butions of each subject and the average contributions of the subjects who were in
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his group in the previous round. The test statistics, based on 16 individual obser-
vations for each session and each round, are signicant at the 5 per cent level in
only about 15 percent of the cases. In addition, within the signicant cases, 30% of
the correlation coe¢ cients are positive and 70% are negative, indicating that there
is no systematic pattern in the relationship between each subjects contribution and
those of his past group members. As a result, considering both the features of the
experimental design and the results of the Spearman tests, we conclude that the
dependence across individuals can be considered negligible. Hence, in the following,
we use subjects as the unit of analysis (see Morgan and Sefton, 2000, for a similar
approach).
3.4.3 Comparison between Treatments: Total Contributions
In order to compare the relative performance of the di¤erent funding mechanisms,
Figure 3.4 displays average individual contributions over rounds for each treatment.8
The introduction of prizes has a substantial e¤ect on individual contributions. Av-
erage contributions in LOT are more than twice as large as in VCM over the 20
rounds, and about ve times as large in the nal round. Average contributions in
APA are almost twice as large as in VCM over the 20 rounds and almost ve times
as large in the nal round.
It is important to observe, however, that VCM is not directly comparable with
the incentive-based treatments in terms of individual contributions. In order to
make the results comparable we must either consider contributions net of the cost of
prizes in the incentive-based mechanisms or, equivalently, refer to overall provision
(i.e. also take into account public provision in VCM). Public provision in VCM
8The graphs conrm that repetition strongly a¤ects each treatment in di¤erent ways. Both
incentive-based mechanisms display high contribution levels in initial rounds, but their dynamics
in the following rounds di¤er. While in the rst ten rounds of APA contributions decline markedly,
in the lottery they remain virtually unchanged. Thereafter, contributions fall somewhat in LOT,
while they remain constant in APA. As a consequence, focusing on nal rounds only, LOT and
APA converge to very similar contribution levels. VCM contributions are on a downward trend




















Figure 3-4: Average individual contributions: all treatments
accounts for 120 tokens per group, corresponding to about 17 percentage points per
subject in terms of relative contributions. Figure 3.5 displays average public good
provision over rounds, providing the appropriate reference for comparing incentive-
based mechanisms with the benchmark VCM.
Interestingly, when we compare the treatments in terms of overall provision (or,
equivalently, contributions net of the cost of prizes), the comparison of the incentive-
based mechanisms relative to VCM is not as clear-cut as before. While LOT sys-
tematically outperforms VCM (with the only exception of the rst round), APA
provision is very close to VCM, except for the last rounds where the two proles
diverge. Averaging over all rounds, relative to VCM, public good provision in LOT
is about 20 per cent higher and 3.5 per cent higher in APA.
The informal evidence presented in Figure 3.5 is examined further in Table 3.5,
presenting results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the null hypothesis that median
public good provision is the same across treatments. The rst two tests compare each
of the incentive-based mechanisms with the benchmark VCM. The next compares
APA with LOT. Given that our model predicts the direction of departure from the
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null hypothesis, we use the relevant one sided-tests.
Table 3.5: Tests of equality between treatments: All subjects
Rounds
Treatments 1-20 1 1 - 10 11-20 20
LOT - VCM 4.55 -3.10 3.43 4.75 5.22
(0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
APA - VCM 1.88 -1.55 1.12 1.52 4.75
(0.03) (0.94) (0.13) (0.06) (0.00)
APA - LOT -4.09 1.52 -2.84 -4.39 -0.92
(1.00) (0.06) (1.00) (1.00) (0.82)
Note: the table reports Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (normalized z-statistics) for the hypothesis that
the median of the di¤erence between individual relative provisions to the public good in the given
two treatments is zero. P-values (in brackets), based on the standard normal distribution, refer to
one-sided tests as predicted by the theory.
The test statistics are positive and highly signicant at all time horizons (except
for round 1) in the comparison between LOT and VCM. APA provision also sig-
nicantly outperforms VCM, although the signicance level is quite variable across
sub-samples, owing to the di¤erent e¤ects of repetition in the two treatments.
Result 3.1: Both the lottery and the all-pay auction are more e¤ec-
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tive than voluntary contribution in funding public goods.
The comparison between LOT and APA indicates that not only APA does not
perform better than LOT, but also public good provision is statistically higher in
LOT than in APA, contrary to the models predictions.
Result 3.2: The lottery is more e¤ective than the all-pay auction in
funding public goods.
It is interesting to observe that incentive-based funding mechanisms are generally
e¢ cient in covering the cost of the prize. Averaging over all sessions and rounds for
each treatment, group contributions cover the cost of the prize in 96.3 per cent of the
cases in LOT and 88.3 per cent of the cases in APA. Thus the lottery outperforms
the all-pay auction also in terms of nancial e¢ ciency.
3.4.4 Comparison between Treatments by Income Level
So far we have considered contributions by taking averages over all subjects, thus
abstracting from di¤erences across individuals characterized by di¤erent income lev-
els. The theory, however, provides predictions for the contributions of each income
type (see Table 3.1). In this section we focus explicitly on income heterogeneity. We
rst examine whether individuals with di¤erent incomes behave as predicted by the
theory and how over-contribution is related to income levels. Next, we consider how
di¤erent funding mechanisms compare at di¤erent ends of the income distribution.
Table 3.6 and Figures 3.6 and 3.7 provide a description of the relationship be-
tween contributions and income levels. In all treatments absolute provisions rise
with income levels, so that relative provisions are generally relatively similar across
income types. Over-contributions in VCM are observed for all income types, and
rise slightly with income in absolute terms. In LOT all income types over-contribute
and, contrary to the theoretical predictions, absolute contributions rise almost lin-
early with income. In APA, absolute contributions rise with income, although not as
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steeply as predicted by the theory. As a consequence, the three lowest-income types
over-contribute, while the contributions of subjects with the highest income (240)
are very close to the theoretical prediction.
Result 3.3: Absolute contributions are weakly related to income in
VCM, and steeply increasing in income in both LOT and APA.
Table 3.6: Average relative contributions: by endowment and rounds
Rounds
Endowment Predicted 1 - 20 1 1 - 10 11 - 20 20
VCM-120 0.0 28.4 37.8 36.5 20.2 9.2
VCM-160 0.0 15.3 31.5 16.3 14.4 8.6
VCM-200 0.0 23.8 35.8 27.2 20.3 10.8
VCM-240 0.0 19.0 35.1 24.6 13.4 4.1
LOT-120 37.5 47.1 36.6 52.0 42.3 40.3
LOT-160 28.1 48.2 46.4 49.8 46.6 45.6
LOT-200 22.5 48.5 46.3 49.8 47.1 43.1
LOT-240 18.7 44.1 47.7 46.0 42.2 32.3
APA-120 4.2 35.6 49.3 35.7 35.6 37.6
APA-160 17.5 40.7 35.7 42.3 39.1 41.5
APA-200 34.0 40.8 53.8 46.4 35.1 36.9
APA-240 42.5 41.1 53.1 48.5 33.7 33.2
Note: contributions are expressed as a percentage of the endowment.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 provide a comparison of absolute and relative provision in
the three treatments by income levels.9 Interestingly, the lottery outperforms both
other mechanisms for all income types. Public good provision in APA is higher than
in VCM for income types 160 and 240, but the opposite holds for the lowest income
type, indicating that prizes in contests provide relatively less e¤ective incentives for
poorer individuals.
Table 3.7 presents results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the null hypothesis that
median public good provision is the same across treatments, when considering sepa-
9Note that in order to ensure comparability we assumed that in VCM the 120 tokens of public
provision can be attributed to each income-type on the basis of equal income shares (about 17%).
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rately each income type. The results indicate that LOT performs signicantly better
than VCM for all income types except the lowest. LOT also performs signicantly
better than APA for incomes 120 and 200. APA does signicantly better than VCM
only for income type 160.
Result 3.4: The lottery outperforms the other funding mechanisms for
all income types.
3.4.5 Comparison between Treatments at Individual Level
We nally consider the relative performance of the three mechanisms at the indi-
vidual level. Figure 3.10 compares the cumulative distribution functions of relative
contributions for the three treatments. The main di¤erence between the two prize-
based mechanism is that in APA subjects choose zero contributions about three
times as often as in LOT (20.8 and 5.83 per cent, respectively). The cumulative
distribution for APA lies above that for LOT only up to a relative contribution of
50 per cent, while the two distributions are virtually identical thereafter. Note also
that, although average contributions in APA and VCM are relatively similar, the
distributions of individual contributions in the two treatments are similar only for
low relative contributions.
Result 3.5: At the individual level, APA is characterized by a much
higher fraction of zero contributions than LOT.
Figure 3.11 compares the cumulative distribution functions of relative contribu-
tions for the three treatments, considering individual income types. It is interesting
to observe that the di¤erence between APA and LOT in the frequency of low contri-
butions is very pronounced for low income types, but it becomes less and less evident
for higher income types. While in LOT subjects contribute almost uniformly irre-
spective of their income type, in APA low-income individuals contribute zero much
more often, as predicted by the theory. Nevertheless, low relative contributions are
much more frequent than predicted by the theory for high-income individuals.
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Table 3.7: Tests of equality between treatments by income level
Incomes
Treatments 120 160 200 240
LOT - VCM 1.05 2.62 2.09 3.14
(0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
APA - VCM -1.05 2.62 0.00 1.32
(0.85) (0.00) (0.50) (0.09)
APA - LOT -3.14 -1.57 -2.09 -0.52
(0.00) (0.06) (0.98) (0.70)
Note: the table reports Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (normalized z-statistics) for the hypothesis that
the median of the di¤erence between individual contributions in the given two treatments is zero. P-
values (in brackets), based on the standard normal distribution, refer to one-sided tests as predicted
by the theory.




























































































































































































































A number of experimental papers have analysed public good provision when incomes
are heterogeneous. However, these studies have only explored voluntary contribu-
tions. The experimental literature on fund-raising mechanisms based on prizes has
focused on the case of income homogeneity. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst
experimental investigation of the performance of incentive-based fund-raising mech-
anisms when subjects have heterogenous endowments which are private information.
We compared a lottery and an all-pay auction, while also considering a voluntary
contribution mechanism as a benchmark.
The results indicate that the introduction of a prize has sizeable e¤ects on indi-
vidual contributions relative to the VMC. Both the lottery and the all-pay auction
outperform voluntary contributions after taking into account the cost of the prize.
The lottery, in particular, systematically and signicantly outperforms VCM. Av-
eraging over all rounds, public good provision is 20 per cent higher in the lottery
than in VCM. Provision in the all-pay auction is also higher than in VCM, but the
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di¤erence is not signicant in the earlier rounds of the sessions. This is an important
result. It indicates that, in a setting where agents have heterogeneous incomes which
are private information, prize-based fund-raising mechanisms can be an e¤ective way
of overcoming free riding.
The comparison between the incentive-based mechanisms indicates that, contrary
to the theoretical predictions, contributions to the public good are signicantly higher
in the lottery than in the all-pay auction. This result suggests a number of possible
interpretations. It could be argued that subjects are more familiar with lotteries
than with all-pay auctions. As a consequence, they might tend to bid more conserv-
atively in the latter. This intuition is supported by the nding that, at the individual
level, subjects choose zero contributions in APA three times as often as in LOT. It
could also be argued that subjects perceive the lottery as more fair than the all-pay
auction. However, such arguments would not help explain the di¤erences between
our result and those in Orzen (2005) and in Schram and Onderstal (2006). The rst
study found no signicant di¤erence between the two mechanisms, focusing on ho-
mogeneous endowments and complete information. On the other hand, Schram and
Onderstal (2006) focused on the case of symmetric endowments but heterogeneous
preferences which are private information, nding that the all-pay auction raises
higher revenues, as predicted by the theory.
Focusing on income heterogeneity, over-contributions are observed for all income
types in VCM, and are slightly increasing with income in absolute terms. In the all-
pay auction, absolute contributions rise with income, even though not as steeply as
predicted by the theory. In the lottery, all income types over-contribute and, contrary
to the theoretical predictions, absolute contributions rise linearly with income. The
comparison of contributions across treatments indicates that the lottery outperforms
both other mechanisms for all income types. This result indicates that, from a
theoretical perspective, the completely symmetric equilibrium of a lottery game does
not seem to properly describe the actual behaviour of subjects. Further, experiments
on lotteries focusing on homogeneous endowments may be missing a crucial trait of
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the subjects behaviour.
There are several extensions for future research. A crucial point would be to
investigate whether and how the specic features of the experimental designs can ex-
plain the di¤erences between our results and the ndings of other studies (see Orzen,
2005; Schram and Onderstal, 2006). Further, it would be interesting to develop a





Welcome. Thanks for participating in this experiment. If you follow the instruc-
tions carefully and make good decisions you can earn an amount of money that will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment you are
not allowed to talk or communicate in any way with other participants. If you have
any questions raise your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer
it. The rules that you are reading are the same for all participants.
General rules
There are 16 people participating in this experiment. At the beginning of the
experiment each participant will be assigned randomly and anonymously an endow-
ment of either 120, 160, 200, or 240 tokens with equal probabilities.
The experiment will consist of 20 rounds. In each round you will have the same
endowment that has been assigned to you at the beginning of the experiment. In each
round you will be assigned randomly and anonymously to a group of four people.
Therefore, of the other three people in your group you will not know the identity and
the endowment, that could be 120, 160, 200, or 240 tokens with equal probabilities.
How your earnings are determined
In each round you have to decide how to allocate your endowment between an
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT, considering the following
information:
 for each token that you allocate to the INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT you will
receive 2 points.
 for each token allocated to the GROUP ACCOUNT (by you or by any other
of the members of your group), every group member will receive 1 point.
[VCM]
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In each round you will receive 120 bonus points.
At the end of each round the computer will display how many tokens you have
allocated to the two accounts and how many points you have obtained from each
of the two accounts and in total. At the end of the experiment the total number
of points you have obtained in the 20 rounds will be converted in Euros at the rate
1000 points = 1 Euro. The resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
[LOT]
In each round you can win a prize of 240 points on the basis of the following
rules. For each token allocated to the GROUP ACCOUNT you will receive a lottery
ticket. At the end of each round the computer selects randomly the winning ticket
among all the tickets purchased by the members of your group. The owner of the
winning ticket wins the prize of 240 points. Thus, your probability of winning is
given by the number of tokens you place in the GROUP ACCOUNT divided by
the total number of tokens placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT by members of your
group. In case no tokens are placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT, the winner of the
prize is selected randomly among the four members of the group.
At the end of each round the computer will display how many tokens you have
allocated to the two accounts and how many points you have obtained from each of
the two accounts, from the prize, and in total. At the end of the experiment the
total number of points you have obtained in the 20 rounds will be converted in Euros
at the rate 1000 points = 1 Euro. The resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
[APA]
In each round you can win a prize of 240 points on the basis of the following
rules. The member of your group who allocates the highest amount to the GROUP
ACCOUNT is the winner of the prize. In case of ties among one or more group
members, the winner is determined randomly.
At the end of each round the computer will display how many tokens you have
allocated to the two accounts and how many points you have obtained from each of
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the two accounts, from the prize, and in total. At the end of the experiment the
total number of points you have obtained in the 20 rounds will be converted in Euros
at the rate 1000 points = 1 Euro. The resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
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Appendix 3B
In this appendix we study a linear public good game nanced through an all-pay
auction in which one prize is awarded, assuming that players have homogeneous
preferences but heterogeneous endowments and information is complete. We solve
the game for N players, who can have any possible endowment, and for any positive
level of prize.
Consider N players and the set of endowments Z = (z1; :::; zS) such that 0 <
z1 < : : : < zS. Each player has an endowment which assumes a value from the set
Z. Call n[zi] the number of players with endowment zi 2 Z such that
SP
i=1
n[zi] = N .
The playersendowments and their number are common knowledge. With no loss of
generality, assume that n[zi]  0 for 1  i  S   1 and n[zS]  1. Players play a
public good game in which each individual has to choose how much to contribute to
the public good. At the same time they take part in an all-pay auction in which a
prize is awarded to the agent who contributes the most. The bidders are risk-neutral
and they all value the prize at  > 0.
The payo¤ for a player with endowment zi who contributes gi is given by
(zi   gi) + E[; gi; g i] + gi +G i
where G i represents the sum of all other playerscontributions and 1 <  < N .10
We divide our analysis in two parts: the case where n[zS] > 1 and where n[zS] = 1.
More than One Player with the Highest Endowment
We study rst the case in which n[zS] > 1. Let us dene the following equilibrium.
Denition 3.1 Call type-symmetric equilibrium an equilibrium in which agents with
the same endowment play according to the same strategy.
10In the experimental design presented in Section 3.3  = 2.
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There exist three possible scenarios: the prize level can be high, mediumor
low. In the next two propositions, we show that if and only if the prize level is
highthere exists a type-symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 When n[zS] > 1 and zS  n[zS ]( 1) , there exists a type-symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium in which players with endowment zS contribute their full
endowment, while if there are other agents with lower endowments they all contribute
0.
Proof. If all players with endowment zS contribute their full endowment each of




  (   1)zS +G i
which is greater or equal than the payo¤ he could get from any other choice g 2
[0; zS).11
If there are other players with lower endowments it is equally obvious that con-
tributing 0 is for them a dominant strategy.
Proposition 3.2 When n[zS] > 1 and n[zS ]( 1) < zS, there exist no type-symmetric
pure strategy equilibria.
Proof. In order to prove this it is enough to show that there exist no equilibria in
which players with endowment zS play according to the same pure strategy. The
proof is in two parts.
i) Consider rst the case in which 
n[zS ]( 1) < zS 

 1 . Suppose that players
with endowment zS contribute g 2 [0; zS), then player i has an incentive to raise his
own bid by an amount " and win the prize. Equally, if all of them contribute zS,
then player i has an incentive to contribute 0.
11In all the proofs G i represents the sum of all other agentscontributions.
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ii) Consider now the case in which zS >

 1 . Notice rst that any contribution
g > 
 1 is dominated by g = 0. Suppose that players with endowment zS contribute
g 2 [0; 
 1). Player i has an incentive to raise his own bid by an amount " and win
the prize. On the other hand if all of them contribute g = 
 1 , then player i has an
incentive to deviate and contribute nothing.
If the prize level is mediumonly the agents with the highest endowment will
submit non-zero bids.
Proposition 3.3 When 
n[zS ]( 1) < zS <

 1 and n[zS] > 1 there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium in which:
 players with endowment zS contribute their full endowment with probability p
and with probability 1   p they choose their contribution from the distribution




n[zS ] 1 on the interval [0; a], such that F (a) = 1   p,







 players with endowments lower than zS contribute 0.
Proof. The proof is in ve parts.
Let us rst focus on the players with endowment zS and show that, when they
are the only active bidders, the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium.
i) Assume that all but one of the n[zS] players with endowment zS choose their




n[zS ] 1 on the interval
[0; a], where 0 < a < zS. Then the expected payo¤ of the remaining player i from
contributing g 2 [0; a] is given by
zS + (F (g))
n[zS ] 1   (   1)g +G i
= zS +G i
which is independent of g.
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Assume now that n[zS]  1 players contribute their full endowment with proba-
















pj(1 p)n[zS ] j 1 represents is probability of tying with j other players,
while 
j+1
is his expected prize when he ties with j others. Applying binomial rules
expression (3.3) can be rewritten as

1  (1  p)n[zS ]
n[zS]p
and therefore player is expected payo¤ from playing zS is given by
zS + 
1  (1  p)n[zS ]
n[zS]p
  (   1)zS +G i
For this to be an equilibrium player is expected payo¤ from contributing zS must
be equal to his expected payo¤ from choosing any g 2 [0; a], which means that
zS + 
1  (1  p)n[zS ]
n[zS]p
  (   1)zS +G i
= zS +G i
Therefore p must satisfy the following






ii) We are going to prove that there is a unique solution to equation (3.4). This
equation can be rewritten as




Notice that the left hand side is concave while the right hand side is linear. Further,
given the restrictions on zS, it is the case that 1 <
n[zS ]( 1)zS

< n[zS]. When p = 0
both sides of the equation are equal to zero. When p = 1 the left hand side is equal
to 1 while the left hand side is strictly greater than 1. Finally, notice that the slope
of the left hand side when p = 0 is n[zS], which is steeper than the right hand side.
Therefore there must be a unique solution for p 2 (0; 1].
iii) We want to show that a, such that F (a) = 1  p, is strictly less than zS. We
will prove it by contradiction. Assume the opposite, then it should be the case that
F (zS)  1  p. Given equation (3.4), the latter can be rearranged as
1  (1  p)n[zS ]  n[zS]p(1  p)n[zS ] 1 (3.5)
When p = 0 both sides are equal to 0. The rst derivative of the left hand side
is equal to n[zS] (1  p)n[zS ] 1, while the rst derivative of the right hand side is
n[zS] (1  p)n[zS ] 1  (n[zS]  1)n[zS]p(1  p)n[zS ] 2. Notice that the former is strictly
greater than the latter for any p on the interval (0; 1]. Therefore the left hand
side of inequality (3.5) is strictly greater than the right hand side for any positive
probability, which contradicts our assumption.
iv) What we have just shown means that the players will not choose any contri-
bution from the interval (a; zS). Let us check that this is the case. Assume that all
other players play according to the candidate equilibrium while player i contributes







n[zS ] 1 )n[zS ] 1   (   1)g +G i
= zS + (   1)a  (   1)g +G i
which is strictly less than zS +G i. Therefore contributing 0 dominates any choice
g 2 (a; zS).
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v) Let us now show that, when players with endowment zS play according to the
equilibrium candidate, it is a dominant strategy for all the other players to contribute
nothing. Suppose that zS 1 > a. Point iv) proves that contributing 0 dominates any
g 2 (a; zS 1]. On the other hand, if a player i with endowment zi < zS contributes
















it must be the case that contributing 0 is a dominant strategy for all players with
endowment lower than zS.
The same is true when zS 1  a.
Finally, if the prize level is lowonly the players with endowments higher than

 1 will contribute positive amounts.
Proposition 3.4 When zS   1 and n[zS] > 1, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which:
 players with endowment zi   1 choose their contributions from the distri-




m 1 on the interval [0; 
 1 ], where m is the
number of players with endowment greater or equal than 
 1 ;
 all other players contribute 0.
Proof. Suppose that zl 1 <  1 while zl 

 1 , with 1  l  S, and call m =
SP
i=l
n[zi] the number of players with endowment greater or equal than

 1 . If l = 1
then consider zl 1 to be zero. The proof is in four parts.
i) Notice rst that any strategy above 
 1 is dominated by contributing 0.
ii) Let us focus on the interval (zl 1;

 1 ] where onlym players are active. Assume
that all but one of the m players choose their contribution from the distribution
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function F (g) on the interval (zl 1;

 1 ]. In order for this to be an equilibrium the
remaining player i must be indi¤erent to play any g 2 (zl 1;  1 ]. Hence his expected
payo¤ from playing g must be
zi + (F (g))
m 1   (   1)g +G i = zi +G i + c
where c  0.
This means that on the interval (zl 1;

 1 ] any player with endowment greater
than zl 1 randomises according to the following distribution function
F (g) = (





Note that F ( 
 1)  1 implies that c must be equal to 0 and therefore we have a
unique solution






iii) Suppose that l = 1. When the other N   1 players choose their contribution
from F (g) on the interval [0; 
 1 ], then player is expected payo¤ is equal to
zi +G i
independently of his contribution on the same interval.
iv) If l > 1 then point v) of the proof of Proposition (3.3) shows that contributing
0 is a dominant strategy for all players with endowment less than 
 1 , while players
with higher endowments will randomise according to F (g) from the interval [0; 
 1 ].
Only One Player with the Highest Endowment
We look now at the case where n[zS] = 1. First we will prove that only mixed
strategy equilibria exist.
108
Proposition 3.5 When n[zS] = 1 there exist no pure strategy equilibria.
Proof. The proof is in two parts.
i) Consider the case zS 1 <

 1 . Suppose that there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium characterised by the strategy prole [g1; : : : ; gi; : : : ; gN ], where gi is the
contribution chosen by the generic player i. Call gh the highest contribution. If
gh > zS 1 then the player with endowment zS could marginally lower his bid and
increase his payo¤. If gh < zS 1 then there is at least one player who could deviate
and contribute gh + ", winning the prize and making a positive prot. If gh = zS 1
and a player with endowment zS 1 is contributing gh, then the player with the highest
endowment has an incentive to deviate and contribute zS 1+". If gh = zS 1 and the
players with endowment zS 1 are contributing strictly less than gh, then the player
with endowment zS could lower his bid increasing his payo¤.
ii) Consider the case zS 1   1 . Notice that any strategy g >

 1 is dominated
by g = 0. As we have done above, suppose that there exists a pure strategy equilib-
rium characterised by the strategy prole [g1; : : : ; gi; : : : ; gN ] and call gh the highest
contribution. If gh <

 1 then there is at least one player who has an incentive to
deviate and contribute gh + ". If gh =

 1and only one player is contributing gh,
then he could lower his bid. If gh =

 1 and two or more players are bidding gh,
then each one of them would be better o¤ by contributing zero.
There exist two possible cases: when the prize level is lowand when it is high.
Let us start focusing on the rst scenario.
Proposition 3.6 When zS 1   1 and n[zS] = 1, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which:
 players with endowment zi   1 choose their contributions from the distri-




m 1 on the interval [0; 
 1 ], where m is the
number of players with endowment greater or equal than 
 1 ;
 all other players contribute 0.
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Proof. Proof as in Proposition (3.4).
When the prize level is high, specically zS 1 <

 1 , if the strategy space is
continuous, and ties are broken by randomly assigning the prize to one player, then
no equilibrium exists. In order to avoid this problem, given that we are interested in
the theoretical predictions of an experiment, where the strategy space is discrete, we
will assume that there exists a smallest currency unit strictly above zS 1 (see Che
and Gale, 1997).12
Proposition 3.7 When zS 1 <  1 and n[zS] = 1, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which:
 the player with endowment zS chooses his contribution from the distribution






on the interval [0; zS 1]
and puts a mass equal to  ( 1)zS 1

on the smallest currency unit strictly
above zS 1;











n[zS 1] on the interval (0; zS 1];
 all other players contribute zero.
Proof. Assuming that the players with budgets zS 1 and zS are the only ones who
submit positive bids, we show that by playing according to the equilibrium candidate
they make each others indi¤erent between any possible choice. We then go on to
prove that if they play in such a way it is a dominant strategy for all other players
to contribute zero. The proof is in three parts.
12The non-existence of the equilibrium is due to a discontinuity in the payo¤s. Another way to
avoid this problem would be to always break ties in favour of the player with the higher budget.
110
i) Let us start supposing that the players with endowments strictly lower than
zS 1 contribute zero. Note rst that the player of type zS can guarantee himself a
positive surplus by submitting a bid above zS 1. We want to show that if players





n[zS 1] , then the agent with the highest endowment is indi¤erent
between any choice on the interval (0; zS 1]. His payo¤ from playing g 2 (0; zS 1]
will be
zS + (L(g))
n[zS 1]   (   1)g +G i
= zS + (
  (   1)(zS 1   g)

)  (   1)g +G i
= zS +   (   1)zS 1 +G i
which indeed does not depend on g.
ii) Suppose now that the player with endowment zS randomises according to




currency unit strictly above zS 1.13 If all other agents of type zS 1 play according to




n[zS 1] , then the payo¤ of a
player with zS 1 from a choice g 2 [0; zS 1] is given by
zS + (L(g))
n[zS 1] 1H(g)  (   1)g +G i
= zS + (








n[zS 1] (  (   1)(zS 1   g))
n[zS 1] 1
n[zS 1]
 (   1)g +G i
= zS +G i
13Note that, acording toH(g), player zSs bid is strictly positive and therefore no ties are possibile
at zero.
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which again is independent of g. It should be clear now why it is necessary to
assume that there exists a smallest unit strictly above zS 1. If this was not the case
the player with the highest endowment would have a mass point at zS 1. But then,
if ties are broken by randomly assigning the prize to one player, an agent of type
zS 1 would have an incentive to deviate and bid all his endowment.
iii) Finally, we want to show that if the agents of type zS 1 and zS play as we
described then it is a dominant strategy for all other players to contribute zero. If
a player i with endowment zi < zS 1 contributes g 2 (0; zi] his payo¤ is represented
by
zS + (L(g))
n[zS 1]H(g)  (   1)g +G i (3.7)
= zS + (






n[zS 1] (  (   1)(zS 1   g))
n[zS 1] 1
n[zS 1]
  (   1)g +G i
= zS + (




n[zS 1] (   1)g   (   1)g +G i
= zS + (   1)g((




n[zS 1]   1) +G i





n[zS 1] < 1 and we conclude that expression (3.7) is strictly
lower than zS +G i.
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